Corrections to Liberty
Corrections to the latest impression
This regularly reprinted book has been cumulatively corrected over its many impressions. Translations should be made from the latest impression (2024), with the additional corrections in the first list below, except that asterisked corrections should be made only in translations.
| Page | Line | For | Read | |
| i | last | http | https | |
| ix | note 2, 3–4 | on line at http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/, under ‘Writing about Berlin’. | online at http://bit.ly/thes1997. | |
| xxxiii | 10 up | http | https | |
| * | 4–3 up | additions […] were inserted on pp. 279–80 | additions were made […] | |
| last | omit- | [take over] | ||
| *xxxiv | 15–28 | There was […] for peace. | [omit in translations only] | |
| 20–1 | <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/queries/untracedquotations.html> | <bit.ly/toutcom> | ||
| 24 | <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www | <https://iskra-research.org | ||
| notes | [renumber old note 1 as note 2 in text and notes] | |||
| *55 | note 2 | [replace with new note] | ² A typical Berlinian ‘improvement’ of ‘Any contemporary of ours who wants peace and comfort before anything has chosen a bad time to be born’, from Leon Trotsky, ‘Hitler’s Victory’, Manchester Guardian, 22 March 1933, pp. 11–12 at p. 11, reprinted in Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932–33), ed. George Breitman and Sarah Lovell (New York, 1972), pp. 133–6 at p. 134; for the Russian original, ‘German Fascism in Power: Origins and Perspectives’ (10 March 1933), see e.g. <https://iskra-research.org/Trotsky/sochineniia/1933/19330310.html>. | |
| *127 | 19 up | pardonner | pardonner¹ | |
| * | [bottom of page] | [insert new note 1] | ¹ See <https://bit.ly/toutcom>. | |
| *206 | 5 up | perfect freedom’ | perfect freedom’¹ | |
| * | [bottom of page] | [insert new note 1] | ¹ The Book of Common Prayer, the Order for Morning Prayer, the second collect, for peace. | |
| *208 | 10–13 | just […] contrary. | just: but they do not allow for the variety of human wishes, for the different, quite incompatible, kinds of life for which men are ready to fight and, if need be, die. Nor do such good and rational men allow for the terrible ingenuity with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the road to one ideal also leads somehow to its contrary. Men want too much: they want what is logically impossible. That is why such sacred symbols as ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ and self-governmental ‘rights’ cover such a multitude of ideals which conflict with one another. It is as well to realise this. Things are what they are: status is one thing, liberty another; recognition is not the same as non-interference. In the end we all pay too dearly for our wish to avert our gaze from such truths, for ignoring such distinctions in our attempts to coin words to cover all that we long for, in short for our desire to be deceived. | |
| *209 | 7 | ³ He pointed | In his celebrated essay on the conception of liberty by the ‘ancients’ and the ‘moderns’³ he declares that for modern man liberty means the right not to be arrested, detained, killed, maltreated by the arbitrary will of one or several individuals; the right to express one’s opinion, choose one’s profession and exercise it; to dispose of one’s property, even to abuse it as one pleases; to go and come without having to account for one’s motives or moods, or having to ask permission beforehand; the right to unite with others in the pursuit of one’s interests, to profess whatever faith one wishes with one’s associates, to fill one’s days and hours in accordance with one’s own inclinations, one’s own fancies; finally the right to influence administration by nominating officials, by presenting petitions and demands of which the authorities are obliged more or less to take notice. Liberty in this sense is the security of the enjoyment of the function of private life, and liberty in this sense is something which is guaranteed by institutions which exist for this purpose. This is what modern men mean by liberty and it is not primarily political in content. For the ancient world, on the other hand, liberty meant the exercise, collectively but directly, of a large portion of sovereignty. It meant the right to deliberate publicly, to decide upon war and peace, and treaties with foreign powers, to vote laws, sit in judgement, scrutinise the accounts and acts of public officials, the right to force them to present themselves before the sovereign assembly, to accuse them, condemn them, acquit them. But each man in this system is totally subject to authority. All private acts are in principle to be open to the surveillance of public officials. Nothing is to be left to the independent judgement of individuals, above all the choice of religion – to invent or practise a private religion would have appeared blasphemous. Terpander could not add a string to his lyre without offending the State. A young Spartiate could not visit his wife freely. In Rome, censors could enquire into the most intimate details of private life. Morals were controlled by the law, and since everything is affected by morals, everything was subject to law. The individual, sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in his private life; the all-powerful judge, inquisitor, legislator who condemned men to death and sent them into exile was wholly repressed in private. Liberty meant the sharing of public power. The danger to the modern conception of liberty is that, while absorbed in private life, we let our political rights – without which our private liberties may slip away – go too cheaply and be captured by adventurers. The danger to the liberty of the ancients is that in pursuit of political control they allowed their private freedom to go almost completely. The two types of freedom are plainly not compatible with each other, and if I barter my private freedom for the right to take part in collective decisions which may interfere vastly with my private desires, am I more or less free? The ambiguity of the word ‘freedom’ – or one of its many ambiguities – could hardly be brought out more vividly. Constant pointed |
|
| * | note 3 | ³ See pp. 279–80. | ³ De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes (Paris, 1819): ‘The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns’, in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, trans. and ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge, 1988). |
Corrections to earlier impressions
The corrections in this list (all needed in the first impression except for errors made in the course of correction) have been cumulatively made in subsequent impressions, and should be included in translations, which should therefore be made from the latest impression (2024). Corrections to pp. i and iv, which have been extensively changed on more than one occasion, are not exhaustively listed. Most corrections to Ian Harris’s essay and to the index, both of which have been revised throughout, are not listed either, except for the most recent ones, made since the revisions. Corrections marked with § have been made only in the English edition.
| Page | Line | For | Read | |
| i | 11 | held the Presidency | served as President | |
| 12 | Marx, | Marx, The Age of Enlightenment, [roman commas] | ||
| 5–3 up | several […] remaining two volumes. | many other books by Berlin, including all those listed above, and a four-volume edition of his letters. Ian Harris is Lecturer in Early Modern History at the University of Leicester. His ‘Isaiah Berlin: Two Concepts of Liberty’ appeared in Murray Forsyth and Maurice Keens-Soper (eds), The Political Classics: Green to Dworkin (1996). |
||
| 8 up | letters. | letters. He is co-editor of The One and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin (2007), editor of The Book of Isaiah: Personal Impressions of Isaiah Berlin (2009), and author of In Search of Isaiah Berlin: A Literary Adventure (2018). | ||
| 2 up | [insert below] | https://isaiah-berlin.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/ | ||
| iv | 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25 | The Isaiah | The Trustees of the Isaiah | |
| 23 [Editorial matter] | 2016 | 2016, 2023 | ||
| 31 | 2022 | 2024 | ||
| vi | note 1, 1 | London and Princeton, 2002, pp. 103– 4. | Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, 2014: Princeton University Press), p. 112. | |
| §vii | 9 | [add new entry below] | Two additions to ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ 279 | |
| 2 up | 367 | 375 | ||
| last | 371 | 379 | ||
| viii | 5 | xxxiv | 2 | |
| xi | note 4, 1 | in | in my preface to | |
| note 4, 3 | , pp. vii–viii | [delete] | ||
| xv | 11 | ever since | ever since it was published | |
| xvi | 12 | Knapheis | Knapheis (from 1967 Tolkien): | |
| 13 | […] I should | I should | ||
| xvii | 12 | […] | . … | |
| xix | 3 | reproduced on page 2 | see page xxxiv below | |
| 9 | you […] It | you. … it | ||
| xx | 8 | […] | …. | |
| xxii | 2–8 | break off quotation as at bottom of page: if this takes up more space, absorb this by reducing leading through page | ||
| 16 | were | was | ||
| xxv | 7 | page numbers | pages | |
| 9 up | (1978) | (1978; 2nd ed., 2019) | ||
| 6 up | (1978) | (1978; 2nd ed., 2008) | ||
| last | is being published by Chatto and Windus | was published | ||
| xxvi | 1 | and by Princeton University Press | [delete] | |
| 2 | Liberty. | Liberty (and in a second edition in 2014). | ||
| note 1, 2 | (1990) | (1990; 2nd ed., 2013) | ||
| xxvii | 17 up | (1979) | (1979, 2nd ed., 2013) | |
| 15 up | (1996) | (1996, 2nd ed., 2019) | ||
| 14 up | (1999) | (1999, 2nd ed., 2013) | ||
| xxviii | 2 | before him | before him (see page 282 below) | |
| 10 | (2000) | (2000; 2nd ed., 2013) | ||
| 10 | (2000) | (2000; 2nd ed., 2013) | ||
| xxx | 19 | warmly appreciative | long and thoughtful | |
| note 1 | London, 1946 | New York, 1945; London, 1946 | ||
| p. 226. | chapter 23, 2nd paragraph. | |||
| xxxiii | 4 | individual | other | |
| note [now note 2], 2 | Political | Political | ||
| Postscript | Replace with new text: | A series of revealing early drafts of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ were published in 2014. Some of these are online at <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/tcl/>, and others constitute an appendix to the second edition of Berlin’s Freedom and Its Betrayal (Princeton, 2014). The much shorter text that Berlin delivered in Oxford in 1958 is an appendix to the second edition of Political Ideas in the Romantic Age (Princeton, 2014). The postscript to Ian Harris’s essay was updated in 2016 to include, among other recent publications, the new editions of eleven of Berlin’s books published by Princeton University Press in 2013–14,¹ and the last two volumes of Berlin’s selected letters. For a more detailed survey of recent literature, readers may consult George Crowder’s ‘After Berlin: The Literature since 2002’ at <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/onib/after-berlin.pdf>. The fourth impression of Liberty gave me the opportunity to add the source of the quotation ascribed by Berlin in ‘Historical Inevitability’ (on p. 125), in a somewhat inaccurate form (now corrected), to ‘a French writer’. I am very grateful to Anders Smith for telling me the origin of this elusive remark, for which I had been searching for many years. There was insufficient room in situ for three further missing references. The epigraph from Trotsky on p. 55 is a typical Berlinian ‘improvement’ of ‘Any contemporary of ours who wants peace and comfort before anything has chosen a bad time to be born’, from Leon Trotsky, ‘Hitler’s Victory’, Manchester Guardian, 22 March 1933, pp. 11–12 at p. 11, reprinted in Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932–33), ed. George Breitman and Sarah Lovell (New York, 1972), pp. 133–6 at p. 134; for the Russian original, ‘German Fascism in Power: Origins and Perspectives’ (10 March 1933), see e.g. <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/Trotsky/sochineniia/1933/19330310.html>. For Tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner (p. 127) see <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/queries/untracedquotations.html>, s.v. ‘anon.’. And ‘whose service is perfect freedom’ (p. 206) is from The Book of Common Prayer, the Order for Morning Prayer, the second collect, for peace. H.H. |
||
| § | [after 2nd paragraph of postcript] | [insert new paragraph] | Two additions to the text of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ were inserted on pp. 279–80 in 2023: a new conclusion to section VI added for a radio broadcast, and a passage on Benjamin Constant’s two concepts of liberty that seems to have been inadvertently omitted from section VII in the 1958 text.¹ | |
| xxxiv | notes | [add new note 1] | ¹ These passages may be seen in their original context in ‘The Search for Status’, in The Power of Ideas, 2nd ed., p. 242; and in Freedom and Its Betrayal, 2nd ed., pp. 231–2. | |
| [renumber old note 1 as note 2 in text and notes] | ||||
| note 1, 2 | Political | Political | ||
| [new error in third impression] | [move caption down to fall below illustration as in previous impressions] | |||
| 2 | [insert image and caption from p. xxxiv] | |||
| 5–53 | headline | add letter-spacing between the ‘F’ and the ‘I’ in ‘FIVE’ | ||
| 6 | note 1, 3 | logic and | logic and the | |
| 7 | counsel) | counsel) once more | ||
| 9 | 16 | concept | concepts | |
| 17 | has | have | ||
| 10 | 10 | determinists, | determinists | |
| 11 | step, | step | ||
| note 2, 2 | Sydney | Sidney | ||
| 19 | 2–3 | childish, or at any rate childlike, | ‘childish, or at any rate childlike’, [and add note cue 1 after the second comma] | |
| 12 | 12 | [save line] | ||
| [bottom of page] | [insert new note 1] | op. cit. (p. 11 above, note 1), p. 39 (45). | ||
| 20 | 4 | [move note cue in line 4 to follow ‘interesting.’ in line 6] | ||
| 2 up | us’, | us’; | ||
| note 1 | [replace with] | ‘If the truth should be complex and somewhat disillusioning, it would still not be a merit to substitute for it some more dramatic and comforting simplicity.’ C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (New York, 1929), p. 339. | ||
| 21 | 6 | nor | or | |
| 28 | note 1 | below]. | below, pp. 252–79]. | |
| 31 | note 2, 3 | Warner | Werner | |
| 33 | note 1 | below. | below, pp. 287–321. | |
| 35 | 4 up | both in | in both | |
| 36 | note 1, 3 | jr | Jr | |
| 39 | 6 up | first | second | |
| 4 up | second | first | ||
| 51 | 7 | nichts – | nichts, | |
| note 1, 1–4 | [replace whole note with] | Torquato Tasso in Ernst Raupach, Tasso’s Tod: Trauerspiel in fünf Aufzügen (Hamburg, 1835), act 1, scene 3, p. 56. | ||
| note 3, 2 up | comple`tes | complètes | ||
| 53 | last | that much power | that too much power | |
| 55 | 4 | correct double-struck ‘g’ in ‘Hegelian’ | ||
| note 1 | [replace with] | See p. xxxiv above. | ||
| 67 | 1 | Leontiev | Leont'ev | |
| 70 | continuation of note, 4 | party’ (Cries […] person?) ‘Yes | party [Cries […] person?] Yes | |
| 75 | 8 | ideas, | ideas | |
| 82 | 10 up | has | have | |
| 92 | 8 | ‘out | ‘Out | |
| 12 up | point | pas trop | ||
| note 2 | [replace with] | ‘Above all, gentlemen, not too much zeal.’ This maxim is attributed to Talleyrand in various forms. The earliest published citation of this version known to me is ‘Surtout pas trop de zèle’ (‘Above all, not too much zeal’) in ‘Bien mal acquis ne profite jamais’ (by ‘Marcant’), Revue de Marseille et de Provence 5 no. 7 (July 1839), 335. An earlier version is ‘N’ayez pas de zèle’ (‘Don’t be zealous’), in [C.-A.] Sainte-Beuve, ‘Madame de Staël’, part 2, Revue des deux mondes 1835 ii no. 4 (15 May), 421; ‘point de zèle’ (‘no zeal at all’) is also found, e.g. in ‘Notes et nouvelles’, La revue indépendante 6 (1843), 127; as is ‘Pas de zèle!’ (‘No zeal!’). Ed. | ||
| 95 | 8 | teaching and his influence. | teaching. | |
| 98 | 12 | the motives | motives | |
| 107 | 1 | the pattern, the | the pattern, the | |
| 19 | whole | whole, | ||
| 13 up | time-honoured view | time-honoured, view, | ||
| 111 | note 1, 1 | progres | progrès | |
| 114 | 21 | only be grasped | be grasped only | |
| 116 | note 1, 3 | voluntary | voluntary and involuntary | |
| 118 | 11 | casual | causal | |
| 121 | 3 up | [begin new paragraph at ‘We may’] | ||
| 122 | 4–5 | [run on: no new paragraph] | ||
| 125 | 19–20 | ‘Je ne propose rien […] writer proudly,¹ | ‘[J]e n’impose rien, je ne propose même rien: j’expose,’ said a French writer proudly,¹ | |
| 19 | me^me | même | ||
| 20 | exposition | exposition | ||
| note 1 | See p. xxxiii above. | ‘I insist on nothing; I assert nothing: I explain.’ Charles Dunoyer, De la liberté du travail, ou, Simple exposé des conditions dans lequelles les forces humaines s’exercent avec le plus de puissance (Paris, 1845), vol. 1, p. 18. [omit subtitle in the English edition] | ||
| 127 | 11 | , but not by them, by | – not by them, but by | |
| 129 | note 1 | pp. 183–4. | p. 227. | |
| 153 | 8 | so, | objective, | |
| 166 | note 1, 2 | 1957. | 1957. Ed. | |
| note 2 | 83 | 85 | ||
| 170 | 12 | due | not due | |
| 173 | note 1 | 1: p. 318 in op. cit. (p. | 1, ‘De la souveraineté du peuple’: p. 318 in Écrits politiques (see p. | |
| 181 | 15 | fact, and | fact, | |
| 182 | note 1, 4 | §24 | § 24 | |
| 183 | 4 up | despotism | despotism | |
| 184 | 5 up | conditioning,² is | conditioning² are | |
| 185 | 1 | heart of | heart of the | |
| 18 | slave owner | slave-owner | ||
| 187 | 17 | concept of it | concept of freedom | |
| 196 | 7–6 up | [run on: no new paragraph] | ||
| 6 up | optimism, and | optimism and, | ||
| 197 | 23 | August | Auguste | |
| 203 | 7 | despotism | despotism | |
| 207 | 10 | a | the | |
| 15 up | for | in | ||
| 208 | 21 up | for | for the | |
| 19 up | Frenchmen | Frenchmen, | ||
| §209 | 7 | Constant. | Constant.³ | |
| § | notes | [insert new note 3] | ³ See pp. 279–80. | |
| [renumber old notes 3 and 4 as 4 and 5 in text and notes] | ||||
| 3 up | more | mere | ||
| note 3 | p. 3 | p. 173 | ||
| 210 | note 1 | ibid., | op. cit. (p. 173 above, note 1), | |
| 7 up | by being | by | ||
| 214 | 4 | assurance | an assurance | |
| 219 | 14 | The | On the | |
| 19 | essay, | essay | ||
| 223 | 2 up | apostates, the | apostates and | |
| 224 | 10 | speech: | speech; | |
| 227 | 19 up | worship) | worship), | |
| 228 | note 3, 7 (on p. 229) | Marx) appears | Marx) – appears | |
| 229 | 14 | for without conviction, | for | |
| 230 | note 1, 7–8 | 1978: Oxford University Press) | 1978) | |
| note 1, 7 up | 7.125 | 7. 125 | ||
| 233 | 15 | towards it | towards truth | |
| note 1, 1 | Aereopagita | Areopagita | ||
| 235 | 7 | it is | truth is | |
| note 1 | ‘a contemporary […] Robson. | [Arthur Helps], Thoughts in the Cloister and the Crowd ([London], 1835), p. 2, where it is italicised. | ||
| 236 | note 2 | 233–4. | 223–4. | |
| 241 | 11 | can alone | alone can | |
| 242 | 12 | lecture in this series, | own essay on toleration, | |
| 244 | 13 up | or Condorcet | of Condorcet | |
| 251 | note 1, 4 | not merely in view | in view not merely | |
| 252 | 14 | denied | defined | |
| 268 | 5 | freewill | free will | |
| §279–80 | [insert new matter after 3-line space] | (see pp. xxxiii–xxxiv) 1. When Berlin delivered a version of section VI of his inaugural lecture as a radio talk in 1959, he replaced its last three sentences (on p. 208) with the following passage: Their plea is clear, their cause is just: but they do not allow for the variety of human wishes, for the different, quite incompatible, kinds of life for which men are ready to fight and, if need be, die. Nor do such good and rational men allow for the terrible ingenuity with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the road to one ideal also leads somehow to its contrary. Men want too much: they want what is logically impossible. That is why such sacred symbols as ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ and self-governmental ‘rights’ cover such a multitude of ideals which conflict with one another. It is as well to realise this. Things are what they are: status is one thing, liberty another; recognition is not the same as non-interference. In the end we all pay too dearly for our wish to avert our gaze from such truths, for ignoring such distinctions in our attempts to coin words to cover all that we long for, in short for our desire to be deceived.1 2. The following passage on Benjamin Constant’s two concepts of liberty was intended to appear at the point indicated on p. 209: In his celebrated essay on the conception of liberty by the ‘ancients’ and the ‘moderns’2 he declares that for modern man liberty means the right not to be arrested, detained, killed, maltreated by the arbitrary will of one or several individuals; the right to express one’s opinion, choose one’s profession and exercise it; to dispose of one’s property, even to abuse it as one pleases; to go and come without having to account for one’s motives or moods, or having to ask permission beforehand; the right to unite with others in the pursuit of one’s interests, to profess whatever faith one wishes with one’s associates, to fill one’s days and hours in accordance with one’s own inclinations, one’s own fancies; finally the right to influence administration by nominating officials, by presenting petitions and demands of which the authorities are obliged more or less to take notice. Liberty in this sense is the security of the enjoyment of the function of private life, and liberty in this sense is something which is guaranteed by institutions which exist for this purpose. This is what modern men mean by liberty and it is not primarily political in content. For the ancient world, on the other hand, liberty meant the exercise, collectively but directly, of a large portion of sovereignty. It meant the right to deliberate publicly, to decide upon war and peace, and treaties with foreign powers, to vote laws, sit in judgement, scrutinise the accounts and acts of public officials, the right to force them to present themselves before the sovereign assembly, to accuse them, condemn them, acquit them. But each man in this system is totally subject to authority. All private acts are in principle to be open to the surveillance of public officials. Nothing is to be left to the independent judgement of individuals, above all the choice of religion – to invent or practise a private religion would have appeared blasphemous. Terpander could not add a string to his lyre without offending the State. A young Spartiate could not visit his wife freely. In Rome, censors could enquire into the most intimate details of private life. Morals were controlled by the law, and since everything is affected by morals, everything was subject to law. The individual, sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in his private life; the all-powerful judge, inquisitor, legislator who condemned men to death and sent them into exile was wholly repressed in private. Liberty meant the sharing of public power. The danger to the modern conception of liberty is that, while absorbed in private life, we let our political rights – without which our private liberties may slip away – go too cheaply and be captured by adventurers. The danger to the liberty of the ancients is that in pursuit of political control they allowed their private freedom to go almost completely. The two types of freedom are plainly not compatible with each other, and if I barter my private freedom for the right to take part in collective decisions which may interfere vastly with my private desires, am I more or less free? The ambiguity of the word ‘freedom’ – or one of its many ambiguities – could hardly be brought out more vividly.3 1 De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes (Paris, 1819): ‘On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared to that of the Moderns’, in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, trans. and ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge, 1988). | ||
| 293 | 13 up | century | century BC | |
| 315 | 15 up | fatal | fatal, | |
| 331 | 2 | Russia | Russia, | |
| 338 | 12 | Leontiev | Leont'ev | |
| 340 | 4 | son [previously ‘Son’] | son, | |
| 341 | 8 | would | could | |
| 343 | 7 up | Deutschtom | Deutschtum | |
| 344 | 11 | [Isaiah] | Isaiah Berlin | |
| note 1, 2–3 | a carbon […] top copy. | the original, held in the George F. Kennan Papers, Princeton University Library, which may be viewed at https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/MC076_c00049, folios 149–55. | ||
| 345 | note 1, 2 | puissons | puissions | |
| 351 | note 6 | See pp. | See | |
| 352 | note 1 | p. 345 above. | 345. | |
| 353 | note 12 | Journal | Review | |
| 355 | 4 | Jr. | Jr | |
| 357 | 10 | Kukuthas | Kukathas | |
| 358 | 2 | Sandra | Sondra | |
| 359 | note 4 | See p. | See | |
| note 5 | [replace with new note] | 2nd ed., Princeton, 2013: Princeton University Press, xxix–xxxix. | ||
| 360 | note 11 | See p. | See | |
| 364 | 5 up | form (see opposite) on | form on | |
| [delete last line of main text] | ||||
| note 14, 2 | [add at end] | [It does not appear in the second edition.] | ||
| 365 ff. | [substitute revised postscript from the current impression] | |||
| 367 [now 375] | 6 | subheadings | headings | |
| 5–7 | move parenthesis to follow ‘opening words’ | |||
| 368 | note 10, 1 | 4 | 8 | |
| 371 ff. [now 379 ff.] | [replace index with thoroughly revised version in the current impression] | |||
| 374 | note 5 | [add below existing text with layout to match p. xxxiii] | Editorial addendum 2023 In 2017 The Age of Enlightenment: The Eighteenth-Century Philosophers was reissued in a second edition, edited by Henry Hardy with a new preface on the history of the book’s genesis (bit.ly/IB-AE2). In 2018 Pimlico published the third edition of Personal Impressions, adding the subtitle Twentieth-Century Portraits. In 2019 Princeton published a second edition of The Sense of Reality, with a foreword by Timothy Snyder. In 2023 a second edition of Michael Ignatieff’s biography of Berlin appeared from Pushkin Press, London. |
|
| 380 | after line 4 | [insert new entry] | Beard, Charles Austin, 58 | |
| [*] | Chasles | [delete entry; in English edition take over ‘138’ in Belloc entry] | ||
| 385 | liberty (freedom), 22 | socio- economic | socio-economic | |
| [*] 386 | Manent | [insert new entry below; in English edition take back ‘350’ in Maistre entry] | ‘Marcant’, 92n | |
| *388 | Plekhanov | [in English edition take back ‘130’] | ||
| Protagoras | [insert new entry above] | proportional representation, 224 | ||
| representation | 3 | 63 | ||
| democracy | democracy; proportional representation |