Mr Vice-Chancellor,

If men never disagreed about the ends of life, if our ancestors had remained undisturbed in the Garden of Eden, the studies to which the Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory is dedicated could scarcely have been conceived. For these studies spring from, and thrive on, discord. Someone may deny this on the ground that even in a society of saintly anarchists, where no conflicts about ultimate purpose can take place, political problems, for example constitutional or legislative issues, might still arise. But this objection rests on a mistake. Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, and these are not political but technical, that is to say, capable of being settled by scientific experts, like arguments between engineers or doctors.

That is why those who put their faith in some world-transforming phenomenon, like the final triumph of reason or the proletarian revolution, must believe that all political and moral problems can be turned into technological ones. That is the meaning of Saint-Simon’s [sc. Engels’s] famous phrase about ‘replacing the government of persons by the administration of things’, and the Marxist prophecies about the withering away of the State, and the beginning of the true history of humanity. This outlook is called utopian by those for whom speculation about this condition of perfect social harmony is only the play of idle fancy. Nevertheless, a visitor from Mars to any British – or
American – university today might perhaps be forgiven if he sustained the impression that its members lived in something very like this innocent and idyllic state, for all the serious attention that is paid to [167] political problems by professional philosophers.

Yet this is both surprising and dangerous. Surprising, because there has, perhaps, been no time in modern history when so large a number of human beings, both in the East and the West, have had their notions, and indeed their lives, so deeply altered, and in some cases most violently upset, by social and political doctrines which have bound their spell upon them or their rulers. Dangerous, because when ideas are neglected by those who ought to attend to them – that is to say, those who have been trained to think critically about ideas – they sometimes acquire an unchecked momentum and an irresistible power over great multitudes of men that may grow too violent to be affected by rational criticism. Over a hundred years ago the German poet Heine warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas: philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor’s study could destroy a civilisation. He spoke of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as the sword with which the ancient metaphysical tradition of the West had been decapitated, and described the works of Rousseau as the bloodstained weapon which, in the hands of Robespierre, had destroyed the old regime; and prophesied that the romantic faith of Fichte and Schelling would one day be turned, with terrible effect, against the liberal culture of the West. The facts have not wholly belied this prediction; but if professors can wield this fatal power, it may be that other professors, and they alone, can disarm them.

Our philosophers seem oddly unaware of these effects of their activities. It may be that, intoxicated by their magnificent achievements in more abstract realms, the best among them look with disdain upon a field in which radical discoveries are less likely to be made, and talent for minute analysis is less likely to be rewarded. Yet, despite every effort to separate them, conducted by a blind scholastic pedantry, politics has remained indissolubly intertwined with every other form of philosophical enquiry. To neglect the field of political thought because its unstable subject matter, with its blurred edge, is not to be caught by the fixed concepts, abstract models and fine instruments suitable to logic, or to linguistic analysis – to demand a
unity of method in philosophy, and reject whatever the method cannot successfully manage – is merely to allow oneself to remain at the mercy of primitive and uncriticised political beliefs. It is only a very vulgar historical materialism that denies the power of ideas, and says that [168] without the pressure of social forces, political ideas are still-born; what is certain is that these forces, unless they clothe themselves in ideas, remain blind and undirected.¹

Political philosophy is a branch of moral philosophy, which starts from the discovery, or application, of moral notions in the sphere of political relations. I do not mean, as I think some Idealist philosophers may have meant, that all historical movements or conflicts between human beings are reducible to movements or conflicts of ideas or spiritual forces, nor even that they are all effects (or aspects) of them. But I do mean that to understand such movements and conflicts must be always, in the first place, to understand the ideas and attitudes to life that alone make such movements a part of human history, and not mere natural events. Political words and notions (and political acts) are not intelligible save in the context of the issues that divide the men whose acts and words they are. Consequently our own attitudes and activities are likely to remain obscure to us unless we understand the dominant issues of our own world – the greatest of which is the open war that is being fought between two civilisations and two systems of ideas, which return different and conflicting answers to what has long been the deepest of all political questions – the question of obedience or coercion. ‘Why should I (or anyone) obey anyone else?’ ‘Why should I not live as I like?’ ‘Must I obey?’ ‘If I disobey, may I be coerced? By whom, and to what degree, and in the name of what, and for the sake of what?’

Upon the answers to the question of the permissible limits of coercion, opposed views are held in the world today, each claiming the allegiance of very large numbers of man. It seems to me, therefore, that any aspect of this issue is worthy of examination.

¹ [Here, as in Liberty, I have omitted a dutiful encomium of Berlin’s predecessor in his chair, G. D. H. Cole.]
TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY

I

To coerce a man is to deprive him of freedom – freedom from what? Almost every moralist in human history has praised freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist. I do not propose to discuss either the history, or the more than two hundred senses, of this protean word recorded by historians of ideas. I propose to examine no more than two of these senses – but those central ones, with a great [169] deal of human history behind them, and, I dare say, still to come. The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which I shall call the negative sense, is involved in the answer to the question ‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he wants to do or be, without interference by other persons?’ The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in answer to the question ‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another?’ The two questions are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap.

1. The notion of ‘negative’ freedom

I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no human being interferes with my activity. This is the sense of liberty in which most of the classical English political thinkers, Hobbes, Locke, Paine, Bentham and John Stuart Mill often used it. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can do what he wants. If I am prevented by other persons from doing what I want, I am to that degree unfree; and if the area within which I can do what I want is

2 ‘A free man said Hobbes, ‘is he that […] is not hindered to do what he has a will to.’ Law is always a ‘fetter’ [De civ, chapter 14], even if it protects you from being bound in chains that are heavier than those of the law, say, arbitrary despotism or chaos. Bentham says much the same.
contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced or, it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind, or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I wish to act. If a man is described as being a slave to his passions, there is a feeling that the word is being used in a legitimate and normal, but somewhat metaphorical, sense. Certainly there is some sense in which he is not free. But, whatever the analysis of this sense, it is not primarily a social or a political one: a man who is a slave to his passions is a slave in some sense very different from that in which Uncle Tom was a slave to Simon Legree. Uncle Tom was a slave because he was coerced by another human being to do what he would otherwise not have wanted or decided to do. To be prevented from obtaining what you desire may perhaps, in some cases, be described as a lack of freedom. But you lack political liberty or freedom (I use these terms interchangeably) only if you are prevented from attaining your goal by human beings. Mere incapacity to attain your goal is not lack of political freedom.

This is brought about by the use of such modern expressions as ‘economic freedom’ and its counterpart, ‘economic slavery’. It is argued, very plausibly, that if a man is too poor to afford something on which there is no legal ban – a loaf of bread, a journey round the world, recourse to the law courts – he is as little free to have it as he would be if it were forbidden him by law. If my poverty were a kind of disease, which prevented me from buying bread or paying for

3 I do not, of course, mean to imply the truth of the converse.

4 Helvetius made this point very clearly: ‘The free man is the man who is not in irons, not imprisoned in a gaol, nor terrorised like a slave by the fear of punishment.’ It is not lack of freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale or be a king or a pope or an emperor.
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the journey round the world, or getting my case heard, as a cataract
prevents me from seeing, this inability would not naturally be
described as a lack of freedom at all, least of all political freedom. It is
only because I believe that my inability to get what I want is due to the
fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am
prevented from having enough money with which to pay for it that I
think myself a victim of coercion or slavery. In other words, this use
of the term depends on a particular social and economic theory about
the causes of my poverty or weakness. If my lack of means is due to
my stupidity or bad luck, or the unintentional effect of social or
political institutions, which favours others more, then I speak of
lacking freedom (and not simply lack of economic means) only if I
accept the theory.\(^5\) If, in addition, I believe that I am being kept in
want by a definite arrangement on the part of other human beings
which I consider unjust or unfair, I speak of economic slavery or
oppression. The nature of things does not madden us, only ill will
does, said Rousseau. The criterion is the part that I believe to be
played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, in frustrating my
wishes. By being free in this sense I mean I am not being interfered
with by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my
freedom.

This is certainly what the classical English philosophers meant
when they used this word. They disagreed about how wide the area
could or should be. They supposed that it could not, as things were,
be unlimited, because if it were, it would entail a State in which all
men could interfere without limit with all other men; and this kind of
‘natural’ freedom would lead to social chaos, in which men’s minimum
needs would not be satisfied; or else the liberties of the weak would be
suppressed by the strong.\(^{[171]}\) And since they perceived that human
purposes and activities do not automatically harmonise with one
another; and, because (whatever their official doctrines) they put high
value on other goals such as justice or happiness, or security or
varying degrees of equality, they were prepared to curtail freedom in
the interests of other values and, indeed, of freedom itself. For

\(^5\) The Marxist conception of social laws is, of course, the best-known
version of this theory.
without this it was impossible to create the kind of association that they thought desirable.

Consequently it is assumed by these thinkers that the area of men’s free action must be limited by law. But equally it is assumed (especially by such libertarians as Locke and Mill in England, and Constant and Tocqueville in France) that there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated, for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred. It follows that a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority. Where it is to be drawn is a matter of argument, indeed of haggling. Men are largely interdependent and no man’s activity is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way. ‘Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows’; the liberty of some must depend on the restraint of others. Still, a practical solution has to be found.

Philosophers with an optimistic view of human nature, and a belief in the possibility of harmonising human interests, such as Locke or Adam Smith, and, in some moods, Mill, believed that social harmony and progress were compatible with reserving a large area for private life over which neither the State nor any other authority must be allowed to trespass. Hobbes and those who agreed with him, especially conservative or reactionary thinkers, argued that if men were to be prevented from destroying one another, and making social life a jungle or a wilderness, greater safeguards must be instituted to keep them in their places, and wished correspondingly to increase the area of centralised control, and decrease that of the individual. But both sides agreed that some portion of human existence must remain independent of the sphere of social control. To invade that preserve, however small, would be despotism. The most eloquent of all defenders of freedom and privacy, Benjamin Constant, who had not forgotten the Jacobin dictatorship, declared that at the very least the liberty of religion, opinion, expression, property must be guaranteed
against arbitrary invasion. Jefferson, Burke, Paine, Mill compiled
different catalogues of individual liberties, but the argument for
keeping authority at bay is always substantially the same. We must
preserve a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not to
‘degrade or deny our nature’. We cannot remain absolutely free, and
must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-
surrender is self-defeating.

What then must the minimum be? That which a man cannot give
up without offending against the essence of his human nature. What is
this essence? What are the standards which it entails? This has been,
and perhaps always will be, a matter of infinite debate. But whatever
the principle in terms of which the area of non-interference is to be
drawn, whether it is that of natural law or [174] natural rights, or of
utility or the pronouncements of a categorical imperative, or the
sanctity of the social contract, or any other concept with which men
have sought to clarify and justify their convictions, liberty in this sense
means liberty from; absence of interference beyond the shifting, but
always recognisable, frontier.

‘The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way’, said the most celebrated of its champions.
If this is so, is compulsion ever justified? Mill had no doubt that it
was. Since justice demands that all individuals be entitled to a
minimum of freedom, all other individuals were of necessity to be
restrained, if need be by force, from depriving anyone of it. Indeed the
whole function of law was the prevention of just such collisions: the
State was reduced to what Lassalle contemptuously described as the
functions of a nightwatchman or traffic policeman.

What made this protection of individual liberty so sacred to Mill?
In his famous essay he declares that unless men are left to live as they
wish ‘in the part [of their conduct] which merely concerns
[themselves]’, civilisation cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of
a free market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for
spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage.
Society will be crushed by the weight of ‘collective mediocrity’.
Whatever is rich and diversified will be crushed by the weight of
custom, by men’s tendency to conformity, which breeds only
‘withered’ capacities, ‘pinched and hidebound’, ‘cramped and dwarfed’
human beings. ‘Pagan self-assertion’ is as worthy as ‘Christian self-denial’. All the errors which [a man] is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.’ The defence of liberty consists in the ‘negative’ goal of warding off interference. To threaten a man with persecution unless he submits to a life in which he exercises no choices of his goals; to block before him every door but one, no matter how noble the prospect upon which it opens, or how benevolent the motives of those who arrange this, is to sin against the truth that he is a man, a being with a life of his own to live. [175] This is the idea of liberty as it has been conceived by liberals in the modern world from the days of Erasmus (some would say of Occam) to our own. Every plea for civil liberties and individual rights, every protest against exploitation and humiliation, against the encroachment of public authority or the mass hypnosis of custom or organised propaganda, springs from this individualistic, and much disputed, conception of man.

Three aspects of this position may be noted. In the first place Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater, evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. This is the ‘negative’ conception of liberty in its classical form. The other is that men should seek to develop a certain type of character, of which Mill approved – fearless, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on, and that such a character can be bred only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show (as indeed was argued by James Stephen in his formidable attack on Mill in his *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*), that independence and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities among, for example, the puritan Calvinists in Scotland or New England, or under military
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discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is so, Mill’s argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius would fall to the ground. If his two goals proved incompatible, Mill would be faced with a cruel dilemma, quite apart from the further difficulties created by the inconsistency of his doctrines with strict utilitarianism, even in his own humane version of it.  

In the second place the doctrine is comparatively modern. There seems to be scarcely any consciousness of individual liberty as a political ideal in the ancient world. Condorcet has already remarked that the notion of individual rights is absent from the legal conceptions of the Romans and Greeks; this seems to hold equally of the Jewish, Chinese and all other ancient civilisations that have since come to light.  

The domination of this ideal has been the exception rather than the rule, even in the recent history of the West. Nor has liberty in this sense often formed a rallying cry for the great masses of mankind. The desire not to be impinged upon, not to be dictated to, to be left to oneself, has been a mark of high civilisation both on the part of individuals and communities. The desire to be left to live one’s life as one chooses, the sense of privacy itself, of the area of personal relationships as something sacred in its own right, is a conception of freedom which, for all its religious roots, is scarcely older, in its developed state, than the Renaissance or the Reformation. Yet its

6 This is but another illustration of the natural tendency of all but a very few thinkers to believe that all things they hold good must be intimately connected, or at least compatible with one another. The history of thought, like the history of nations, is strewn with examples of inconsistent, or at least disparate, elements artificially yoked together in a despotic system, or held together by the danger of some common enemy. In due course the danger passes, and conflicts between the allies arise, which often disrupt the system, sometimes to the great benefit of mankind.

7 See the valuable discussion of this in Michel Villey, *Leçons de l'histoire de la philosophie du droit*, who traces the embryo of the notion of subjective rights to Occam.

8 Christian (or Jewish) belief in the absolute authority of either divine or natural laws, or in the equality of all men in the sight of God, is very different from belief in freedom to live as one prefers.
decline would mark the death of civilisation, of an entire moral outlook.

The third characteristic of this notion of liberty is of greater importance. It is that liberty in this sense is not compatible with some kind of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source. Just as democracy may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many liberties which he might have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of personal freedom. The despot who leaves his subjects a wide area of liberty may be unjust, or encourage the wildest inequalities, care for little order, or virtue, or knowledge; but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at least curbs it less than many other regimes, he meets with Mill’s specification.9

[177] Freedom in this sense is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government. Self-government may, on the whole provide a better guarantee of the preservation of civil liberties than other regimes, and has been defended as such by libertarians. But there is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic rule. The answer to the question ‘Who governs me?’ is logically distinct from the question ‘How far does government interfere with me?’ It is in this difference that the great contrast between the two concepts of negative and positive liberty, in the end, consists.10 For the ‘positive’ sense of liberty comes to light if we try to

9 Indeed, it is arguable that in the Prussia of Frederick the Great or in the Austria of Joseph II, men of imagination, originality and creative genius, and, indeed, minorities of all kinds, were less persecuted and felt the pressure, both of institutions and custom, less heavy upon them than in many an earlier or later democracy.

10 [177] ‘Negative liberty’ is something the extent of which, in a given case, it is difficult to estimate. It might prima facie seem to depend simply on the power to choose between at any rate two alternatives. Nevertheless, not all choices are equally free, or free at all. If in a totalitarian State I betray my friend under threat of torture, perhaps even if I act from fear of losing my
answer the question, not ‘What am I free to do or be?’, but ‘By whom am I ruled?’ or ‘Who is to say what I am, and what I am not, to be or do?’ The connection between democracy and individual liberty is a good deal more tenuous than it seemed to many advocates of both. The desire to be governed myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is said to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same thing. So different is it, indeed, as to job, I can reasonably say that I did not act freely. Nevertheless, I did, of course, make a choice, and could, at any rate in theory, have chosen to be killed or tortured or dismissed. The mere existence of alternatives is not, therefore, enough to make my action free (although it may be voluntary) in the normal sense of the word. The extent of my freedom seems to depend (a) on how many possibilities are open to me (although the method of counting these can never be more than impressionistic: possibilities of action are not discrete entities like apples, which can be exhaustively enumerated); (b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualise; (c) how important in my plan of life, given my character and circumstances, these possibilities are when compared with each other; (d) how far they are closed and opened by deliberate human acts; (e) what value not merely the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he lives, puts on the various possibilities. All these magnitudes must be ‘integrated’, and a conclusion, necessarily never precise or indisputable, drawn from this process. It may well be that there are many incommensurable degrees of freedom, and that they cannot be drawn up on a single scale of magnitude, however conceived. Moreover, in the case of societies, we are faced by such (logically absurd) questions as ‘Would the arrangement X increase the liberty of Mr A more than it would of Messrs B, C and D between them, added together? The same difficulties arise in applying utilitarian criteria. Nevertheless, provided we do not demand precise measurement, we can give valid reasons for saying that the average subject of the King of Sweden is, on the whole, a good deal freer today than the average citizen of the Republic of Romania. Total patterns of life must be compared directly as wholes, although the method by which we make the comparison, and the truth of the conclusions, is difficult or impossible to demonstrate. But the vagueness of the concepts, and the multiplicity of the criteria involved, is an attribute of the subject matter itself, not of our imperfect methods of measurement, or incapacity for precise thought.
have led in the end to the great clash of ideologies that dominate our world. For it is this – the ‘positive’ conception of liberty – not freedom from, but freedom to – which the adherents of the ‘negative’ notion represent as being, at times, no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyranny.

II

2. The notion of positive freedom

The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces, of whatever kind. I wish to be a subject, to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his choices and able to explain them by reference to his own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is not.

The freedom which consists in being one’s own master, and the freedom which consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men, may, on the face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each other – no more than a negative and positive way of saying the same thing. Yet the ‘positive’ and [179] ‘negative’ notions of freedom developed in divergent directions until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each other.
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One way of making this clear is in terms of the independent momentum which the metaphor of self-mastery acquired. ‘I am my own master’; ‘I am slave to no man’; but may I not (as, for instance, T. H. Green is always saying) be a slave to nature? Or to my own ‘unbridled’ passions? Are these not so many species of the identical genus ‘slave’ – some political or legal, others moral or spiritual? Have not men had the experience of liberating themselves from spiritual slavery, or slavery to nature, and is it not one in which they become aware, on the one hand, of a self which dominates, and, on the other, of something in them which is brought to heel? This dominant self is then variously identified with reason, with my ‘higher nature’, with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with my ‘real’, or ‘ideal’, or ‘autonomous’ self, or with my self ‘at its best’; this is then contrasted with irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my ‘lower’ nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my ‘empirical’ or ‘heteronomous’ self, swept by every gust of desire and passion, needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its ‘real’ nature.

Presently the two selves may be divided by an even larger gap. The real self may be conceived as divided by an even larger gap: the real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term is normally understood), as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a Church, a State, the great society of the quick and the dead and the yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self, which by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’, single will upon its recalcitrant ‘members’, achieves its own, and therefore their, ‘higher’ freedom.

The perils of using organic metaphors to justify the coercion of some men by others in order to raise them to a ‘higher’ level of freedom have often been pointed out. But what gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of language is that we recognise that it is possible, and perhaps at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some ideal (let us say justice or health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt. In other words, it is possible for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, perhaps even on their behalf. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better
than they know it themselves. What, at most, this entails is that [180] they would not resist me if they were rational, and as wise as I, and understood their interests as I do. But I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may declare that they are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists within them an occult entity – their latent rational will, or their ‘true’ purpose – and that this entity, although it is belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, is their ‘real’ self, of which the poor empirical self in space and time may know nothing or little; and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into account.

Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name of their ‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, fulfilment of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – the free choice of his ‘true’, albeit submerged and inarticulate, self.

This paradox has been often exposed. It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not, and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his – sake; and a very different one to say that he has 

qua ipso\n
chosen it, not indeed consciously, not as he is in everyday life, but in his role as a rational self of which the empirical self may not know – the ‘real’ self which discerns the good, and cannot help choosing it when he sees it. This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realisation. It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good which I am too blind to see; and another that, if it is my good, I am not being coerced, for I have willed it whether I know this or not, and am free even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle [181] against those who seek to impose it with the greatest desperation.

This magical transformation (for which William James so justly mocked the Hegelians) can no doubt be perpetrated just as easily with
the ‘negative’ concept of freedom, where the self that should not be interfered with is no longer the individual with his actual wishes and needs as they are normally conceived, but the ‘real’ man within, identified with the pursuit of some ideal purpose which his empirical self may never have dreamed of; and, as in the case of the ‘positively’ free self, this entity may be inflated grow into some super-personal entity – a State, a class, a nation or the march of history itself – regarded as a more ‘real’ subject of attributes than the empirical self. But the ‘positive’ conception of freedom as self-mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided against himself, lends itself more easily to this splitting of personality into two: the transcendent, dominant controller, and the empirical bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel. This demonstrates (if demonstration of so obvious a truth is needed) that the conception of freedom directly derives from the view that is taken of what constitutes a self, a person, a man. Enough manipulation of the definitions of ‘man’, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes. Recent history had made it only too clear that the issue is not merely academic.

The consequences of distinguishing between two selves will become even clearer if one considers the two major forms which the desire to be self-directed – directed by one’s ‘true’ self – has historically taken: the first that of self-abnegation in order to attain independence; the second that of self-realisation, or total self-identification with a specific principle or ideal in order to attain the selfsame end.

III

1. The retreat to the inner citadel

I am the possessor of reason and will; I conceive ends and I desire to pursue them; but if I am prevented from attaining them I no longer feel master of the situation. I may be prevented by the laws [182] of nature – or by accidents, or the activities of men, or the effect, often undesigned, of human institutions. These forces may be too much for me. What am I to do to avoid being crushed by them? I must liberate myself from desires that I know I cannot realise. I wish to be master
of my kingdom, but my frontiers are long and vulnerable, therefore I contract them in order to reduce or eliminate the vulnerable area. I begin by desiring happiness, or power, or knowledge, or the attainment of some specific object. But I cannot command them. I choose to avoid defeat and waste, and therefore decide to strive for nothing that I cannot be sure to obtain. I determine myself not to desire what is unattainable. The tyrant threatens me with the destruction of my property, with imprisonment, with the exile or death of those I love. But if I no longer feel attached to property, no longer care whether or not I am in prison, if I have killed within myself my natural affections, then he cannot bend me to his will, for all that is left of myself is no longer subject to empirical fears or desires. It is as if I had performed a strategic retreat into an inner citadel – my reason, my soul, my ‘noumenal’ self – which, do what they might, neither external blind force, nor human malice, can touch. I have withdrawn into myself; there, and there alone, I am secure, master of all I possess.

It is as if I were to say: ‘I have a wound in my leg. There are two methods of freeing myself from pain. One is to heal the wound. But if the cure is too difficult or uncertain, there is another method. I can get rid of the wound by cutting off my leg. If I train myself to want nothing to which the possession of my leg is indispensable, I shall not feel the lack of it.’ This is the traditional self-emancipation of ascetics and quietists, of stoics and Buddhist sages, men of various religions, or of none, who have fled the world and the yoke of society or public opinion by some process of deliberate self-transformation that enables them to care no longer for any of its values, to remain, isolated and independent, on its edges, no longer vulnerable to its weapons. ¹¹ All political isolationism, all economic autarky, every form of autonomy, has in it some element of this attitude. I eliminate the obstacle in my path, by abandoning the path; I retreat into my own sect, my own

¹¹ ‘A wise man, though he be a slave, is at liberty, and from this it follows that though a fool rule, he is in slavery’, said St Ambrose. It might equally well have been said by Epictetus or Kant.
planned economy, my own deliberately insulated territory, where no voices from outside need be listened to [183] and no external forces can have effect. This is a form of the search for security, but it has also been called the search for personal or national freedom or independence.

From this doctrine, as it applies to individuals, it is no very great distance to the conceptions of those who, like Kant, identify freedom not indeed with the elimination of desires, but with resistance to them, and with control over them. I identify with the controller and escape the slavery of the controlled. I am free because, and in so far as, I am autonomous. I obey laws, but I have imposed them on, or found them in, my own uncoerced self. Freedom is obedience, but ‘obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves’, and no man can enslave himself. Heteronomy is dependence on outside factors, liability to be a plaything of the external world that I cannot myself fully control, and which pro tanto controls and ‘enslaves’ me. I am free only to the degree to which my person is ‘fettered’ by nothing that obeys laws over which I have no control; I cannot control the laws of nature; my free activity must, therefore, \textit{ex hypothesi}, be lifted above the empirical world of causality. This is not the place in which to discuss the validity of this ancient and famous doctrine; I only wish to remark that the related notions of freedom as resistance to, or escape from, unrealisable desire, and as independence of the sphere of causality, have played a central role in politics no less than ethics.

For if the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings – authors of values, of ends in themselves the ultimate authority of which consist precisely in the fact that they are willed freely – then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous but natural objects, played on by causal influences, creatures at the mercy of external stimuli, whose choices can be manipulated by their rulers, whether by threats of force or offers of rewards. To treat men in this way is to treat them as if they were not self-determined. ‘Nobody may compel me to be happy in his own way,’ said Kant; paternalism is ‘the greatest despotism imaginable’. This is so because it is to treat men as if they were not free but human material for me, the benevolent reformer, to mould in accordance with my own, not their, freely adopted purpose.
This [184] this is, of course, precisely the policy that the early Utilitarians recommended. Helvétius (and Bentham) believed not in resisting, but in using, men’s tendency to be slaves to their passions; they wished to dangle rewards and punishments before men – the acutest possible form of heteronomy – if by this means the ‘slaves’ might be made happier. But to manipulate men, to propel them towards goals which you – the social reformer – see, but they may not, is to deny their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own, and therefore to degrade them.\footnote{Proletarian coercion, in all its forms, from executions to forced labour, is, paradoxical as it may sound, the method of moulding communist humanity out of the human material of the capitalist period.} That is why to lie to men, or to deceive them, that is to use them as means for my, not their own, independently conceived ends, even if it is for their own benefit, is, in effect, to treat them as subhuman, to behave as if their ends are less ultimate and sacred than my own. In the name of what can I ever be justified in forcing men to do what they have not willed or consented to? Only in the name of some value higher than themselves. But if all values are the creations of men, and called values only so far as they are so, there is no value higher than the individual. Therefore to do this is to coerce men in the name of something less ultimate than themselves – bending them to my will, or to someone else’s particular craving for happiness, or expediency, or security, or convenience. I am aiming at something desired by me or my group, to which I am using other men as means. But this is a contradiction of what I know men to be. It is to treat men as things. All forms of tampering with human beings, getting at them, shaping them against their will to your own pattern, all thought-control and conditioning, is, therefore, a denial of that in men which makes them men and their values ultimate.

Kant’s free individual is a transcendent being, beyond the realm of natural causality. [185] But in its empirical form – in which the notion...
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of man is that of ordinary life – this doctrine was the heart of liberal humanism, both moral and political, that was deeply influenced both by Kant and by Rousseau in the eighteenth century. In its a priori version, it is a form of secularised Protestant individualism, in which the place of God is taken by the conception of the rational life, and the individual soul which strains towards union with Him is replaced by the conception of the rational life and of the individual, endowed with reason, straining to be governed by reason and reason alone, and to depend upon nothing that might deflect or delude him by engaging his irrational nature. Autonomy, not heteronomy: to act and not to be acted upon.

The notion of slavery to the passions is – for those who think in those terms – more than a metaphor. To rid myself of fear, or love, or the desire to conform is to liberate myself from the despotism of something which I cannot control. Cephalus, whom Plato reports as saying that old age alone has liberated him from his passion of love – the yoke of a cruel master – is reporting an experience as real as that of liberation from a human tyrant or slave owner. The psychological experience of observing myself yielding to some ‘lower’ impulse, acting from a motive that I dislike, or of doing something which at the very moment of doing I may detest, and reflecting later that I was ‘not myself’, or ‘not in control of myself’, when I did it, belongs to this way of thinking and speaking. I identify myself with my critical and rational moments. The consequences of my acts cannot matter, for they are not in my control. Only my motives are. This is the creed of the solitary thinker who has defied the world and emancipated himself from the chains of men and things. In this form the doctrine may seem primarily an ethical creed, and scarcely political at all; nevertheless its political implications are clear, and it enters into the tradition of liberal individualism at least as deeply as the ‘negative’ concept of freedom.

It is perhaps worth remarking that in its individualistic form the concept of the rational sage, who has escaped into the inner citadel of his true self, seems to arise only when the external world has proved

13 [In fact in Plato’s Republic (book 1, 329c) Cephalus reports Sophocles to this effect. Corrected in later versions.]
exceptionally tyrannical, cruel and unjust. ‘He is truly free’, said Rousseau, ‘who desires what he can perform, and does what he desires’. In a world where a man seeking happiness or justice, or freedom (in whatever sense), can do little because he finds too many avenues of action blocked to him, the temptation to withdraw into himself may become irresistible. It may have been so in Greece, where the Stoic ideal cannot be wholly unconnected with the fall of the independent democracies before centralised Macedonian autocracy. It was certainly so in Rome, for analogous reasons, after the end of the Republic. It arose in Germany in the seventeenth century, the period of the deepest national degradation of the German States that followed the Thirty Years War, when the character of public life, particularly in the small principalities, forced those who prized the dignity of human life, not for the first or last time, into a kind of inner emigration. The doctrine that maintains that, if I desire what I cannot have, I must teach myself not to desire it; that a desire eliminated or successfully resisted is as good as a desire satisfied; is, in the end, a sublime, but unmistakable, form of the doctrine of sour grapes: what I cannot be sure of, I cannot truly want.

Ascetic self-denial may be a source of spiritual strength, but it is difficult to see how it can be called an enlargement of liberty. If I save myself from an adversary by retreating indoors and locking every entrance and exit, I may remain freer than if I had been captured by him, but am I freer than if I had defeated or captured him? If I go too far, contract myself into too small a space, I shall suffocate and die. The logical culmination of the process of destroying everything through which I can possibly be wounded is suicide. While I exist in the natural world I can never be wholly secure. Total liberation

14 It is not perhaps far-fetched to assume that the pietism of the Eastern sages was a response to the despotism of the great autocracies, and flourished at periods when individuals were apt to be humiliated, or at any rate ignored or ruthlessly managed, by those possessed of the instruments of physical coercion.
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in this sense (as Schopenhauer correctly perceived) is conferred only by death.15

I find myself in a world in which I meet with obstacles to my will. Those who are wedded to the ‘negative’ concept of freedom may perhaps be forgiven if they think that self-abnegation is not the only method of overcoming obstacles; that it is possible to do so by removing them: in the case of non-human objects, by physical action; in the case of human resistance, by force or persuasion, as when I induce somebody to make room for me in his carriage, or conquer a country which threatens the interests of my own. Such acts may be unjust, they may involve violence, cruelty and the enslavement of others, but it can scarcely be denied that thereby the agent is able, in the most literal sense, to increase his own freedom. These subjective aims, and the empirical interpretations of the character and value of such actions, are denied by the philosophical, and later by the political, adherents of the ‘positive’ conception of freedom. Their view rules over half our world; for this reason alone its metaphysical basis is worth examination.

IV

[2. Self-realisation]
The only true method of attaining freedom, we are told, is by the use of critical reason, the understanding of what is necessary and what is contingent. If I am a schoolboy, all but the simplest truths of mathematics obtrude themselves as obstacles to the free functioning of my mind, as theorems whose necessity I do not understand; they are pronounced to be true by some external authority, and present themselves to me as foreign bodies which I am expected mechanically

15 It is worth remarking that those who in this period demanded liberty for the individual or for the nation in France did not fall into this attitude, this was precisely because, despite the despotism of the French monarchy and the arrogance and arbitrary behaviour of privileged groups in the French State, France was a proud and powerful nation, where the reality of political power was not beyond the grasp of men of talent, so that withdrawal from battle into some untroubled heaven above it, whence it could be surveyed dispassionately by the self-sufficient philosopher, was not the only way out.
to absorb into my system. But when I [188] understand the functions of the symbols, the axioms, the formation and transformation rules – the logic whereby the conclusions are obtained – and grasp that these things cannot be otherwise, because they appear to follow from the laws that govern the processes of my own reason, then mathematical truths no longer obtrude themselves as external entities forced upon me, which I must receive whether I want to or not, but as something which I now freely will in the course of the natural functioning of my own rational activity. For the mathematician the proof of these theorems is part of the free exercise of his natural logical capacity. To the musician, after he has assimilated the pattern of the composer’s score and has made the composer’s ends his own, the playing of the music is not obedience to external laws, a compulsion and a barrier to liberty, but a free unimpeded exercise. The player does not feel bound to the score as an ox to the plough, or a factory worker to the machine. He has absorbed the score into his own system, has, by understanding it, identified it with himself, has changed it from an impediment to free activity, into an element in that activity itself.

What applies to music or mathematics must, we are told, in principle, apply to all other obstacles which present themselves as so many lumps of external stuff blocking free self-development. That is the programme of enlightened rationalism – sapere aude – from Spinoza to the latest (at times unconscious) disciples of Hegel. What you know, that of which you understand the necessity – the rational necessity – you cannot, while remaining rational, want to be otherwise. For to want something to be other than what it must be is, given the premisses – the necessities that govern the world – to be pro tanto irrational. Passions, prejudices, fears, neuroses spring from ignorance, and take the form of myths and illusions. To be ruled by myths, whether they spring from the wicked imaginations of unscrupulous charlatans who deceive us in order to exploit us, or from psychological or sociological causes, is a form of heteronomy, of being dominated.

16 Or, as some modern theorists maintain, because I have, or could have, invented them for myself, because the rules are man-made.
by outside factors in a direction not necessarily willed by the agent. The
enlightened thinkers of the eighteenth century supposed that the
study of the sciences of nature, and the creation of sciences of society
on the model of natural science, would make the operation of such
causes transparently clear, and thus enable individuals to recognise
their own part [189] in the working of the rational world, irksome only
when misunderstood. Knowledge liberates by automatically
eliminating irrational fears and desires.

Hegel and Marx substituted their own notions of the laws of social
life, but believed, no less than their opponents, that to understand the
world is to be freed. They merely differed from them in stressing the
part played by change and growth in what made human beings human.
The nature of men could not be understood by an analogy drawn
from mathematics or physics. One must also understand history, that
is, the peculiar laws of continuous growth that govern individuals and
groups in their interplay with each other and with nature. Not to grasp
this is, according to these thinkers, to fall into a particular kind of
error, namely the belief that human nature is static, that its essential
properties are the same everywhere and at all times, that it is governed
by unvarying natural laws, whether they are conceived in theological
or materialistic terms, which entails the fallacious corollary that a wise
lawgiver can, in principle, create a perfectly harmonious society at any
time by appropriate education and legislation, because a wholly
rational man, in all ages and countries, must always demand the same
unaltering satisfactions of the same unaltering basic needs. Hegel
believed that his contemporaries (and indeed all his predecessors)
misunderstood the nature of institutions because they did not
understand the laws – the rational, intelligible laws, since they spring
from the operation of human reason – that create and alter institutions
and transform human character and human action. Marx and his
disciples maintained that the path of human beings was obstructed not
only by natural forces or the imperfections of their own character, but
even more by the workings of their own social institutions, which they
had created (not always consciously) for certain purposes, but whose
functioning they came to misunderstand, and which thereupon
became obstacles in their progress. He offered social and economic
hypotheses to account for the inevitability of such misunderstanding,
in particular of the illusion that such man-made arrangements were independent forces, as inescapable as the laws of nature. As instances of such pseudo-objective forces, he pointed to the laws of supply and demand, or of property, or the eternal division of society into rich and poor, or owners and workers, as so many [190] unaltering human categories. Not until we had reached a stage at which the spells of these illusions could be broken, that is, until we understood that these laws and institutions were themselves the work of human minds and hands, historically needed in their day, and mistaken for inexorable, objective powers, could the old world be destroyed, and more adequate and liberating social machinery substituted.

We are enslaved by despots – institutions or beliefs or neuroses – which can be removed only by being analysed and understood. We are imprisoned by evil spirits which we have ourselves – albeit not consciously – created, and can exorcise them only by becoming conscious and acting accordingly. I am free if, and only if, I plan my life in accordance with my own will; plans entail rules; a rule does not oppress me or enslave me if I impose it on myself consciously, or accept it freely, having understood it, whether it was invented by me or by others, provided that it is rational, that is to say, conforms to the necessities of things. To understand why things must be as they must be is to will them to be so. To want necessary laws to be other than they are is to be prey to an irrational desire – a desire that what must be X should also be not-X. To believe these laws to be other than what they necessarily are is to be insane. That is the metaphysical heart of rationalism. The notion of liberty contained in it is not the ‘negative’ conception of a field without obstacles, a vacuum in which I can do as I please, but the notion of self-direction or self-control. I can do what I will with my own. I am a rational being. Whatever I can demonstrate to myself as being necessary, as incapable of being otherwise in a rational society – that is, in a society directed by rational minds, towards goals such as rational beings would have – I cannot, being rational, wish to sweep out of my way. I assimilate it into my substance as I do the laws of logic, of mathematics, of physics, the rules of art, the principles that govern that of which I understand, and
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therefore will, the rational purpose, and which I therefore cannot want to be other than it is.

This is the positive doctrine of liberation by reason. Socialised forms of it are at the heart of many of the nationalist, Marxist, authoritarian and totalitarian creeds of our day. It may, in the course of its evolution, have left its rational moorings. Nevertheless it is this freedom that, in democracies and in dictatorships, is argued about and fought for in many parts of the earth today. Without attempting to trace the historical evolution of this idea, I should like to comment on some of its vicissitudes.

V

[The Temple of Sarastro]

Those who believed in freedom as rational self-direction were bound, sooner or later, to consider how this was to be applied not merely to a man's inner life, but to his relations with other members of his society. Even the most individualistic among them – and Rousseau, Kant and Fichte certainly began as individualists – came at some point to ask themselves whether a rational life not only for the individual, but for society, was possible, and if so, how it was to be achieved. I wish to be free to live as my rational will (my 'real' self) commands, but so must others be. How am I to avoid collisions with their wills? Where is the frontier that lies between my (rationally determined) rights and the identical rights of others? For if I am rational I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reasons, be right for others who are rational like me. A rational (or free) State would be one in which the laws of which would be such that all rational men would freely accept them; that is to say, governed by such laws as they would themselves have enacted had they been asked what, as rational beings, they demanded; the frontiers would be such as all rational men would consider to be the right frontiers for rational beings.

But who, in fact, was to determine what these frontiers were? Thinkers of this type argued that if moral and political problems were genuine – as surely they were – they must in principle be fully soluble; that is to say, there must exist one and only one true solution to any problem, and many false ones; all truths could in principle be
discovered by any rational thinker, and demonstrated so clearly that all other rational men could not but accept them; indeed this was already to a large extent the case in the new natural sciences. On this assumption, political problems were soluble by establishing a just order that would give to each man all the freedom to which a rational being was entitled. My claim to unfettered freedom can prima facie often not be reconciled with your equally unqualified claim; but the rational solution of one problem cannot collide with the equally true solution of another, for two truths cannot logically be incompatible: therefore a just order must in principle be discoverable, an order of which the rules make possible correct solutions to all possible problems that could arise in it. This ideal, harmonious state of affairs was sometimes imagined as a garden of Eden before the fall of man, from which we were expelled, but for which we were still filled with longing, or as a golden age still before us, in which men, having become rational, will no longer be ‘other-directed’ or frustrate one another.

In existing societies justice and equality are ideals which it is still necessary to obtain with some measure of coercion, because the premature lifting of social controls might lead to the oppression of the weaker and the stupider by the stronger or abler, or the more energetic and unscrupulous. But it is only irrationality on the part of men (according to this doctrine) that leads them to wish to oppress or exploit or humiliate one another. Rational men will respect the principle of reason in each other, and lack all desire to fight or dominate one another. The desire to dominate is itself a symptom of irrationality, and can be explained and cured by rational methods. Spinoza offers one kind of explanation and remedy, Hegel another, Marx a third. Some of these theories may perhaps, to some degree, supplement each other, others are not combinable. But they all assume that in a society of perfectly rational beings the lust for domination over men will be absent or ineffective. The existence of oppression — that is, disharmony — will be the first symptom that the true solution to the problems of social life has not been reached.
This can be put in another way. Freedom is self-mastery, the elimination of obstacles to my will, whatever these obstacles may be – the resistance of nature, of my own ungoverned passions, of irrational institutions, of the opposing wills of others. Nature I can always, at least in principle, mould by technical means, and impose my will upon it. But how am I to treat recalcitrant human beings? I must, if I can, impose my will on them too, ‘mould’ them to my pattern, cast parts for them in my play. But will this not mean that I alone am free, while they are slaves? They will be so if my plan has nothing to do with their wishes or values, [193] only with my own. But if my plan is fully rational, it will allow for the full development of their ‘true’ natures, the realisation of their capacities for rational decisions as a part of the realisation of my own. All true solutions to all genuine problems must be compatible; more than this, they must fit into a single whole; for this is what is meant by calling them all rational and the universe harmonious. Each man has his specific character, abilities, aspirations, ends. If I grasp both what these ends and natures are, and how they all relate to one another, I can, at least in principle, if I have the knowledge and the strength, satisfy them all, so long as the nature and the purposes in question are rational. Rationality is knowing things and people for what they are: I must not use stones to make violins, nor try to make born violin-players play flutes. If the universe is governed by reason, then there will be no need for coercion; a correctly planned life for all will coincide with full freedom – the freedom of rational self-direction – for all. This will be so if, and only if, the plan is the true plan – the one unique pattern which alone fulfils the claims of reason. Its laws will be the rules which reason prescribes: they will only seem irksome to those whose reason is dormant, who do not understand the true ‘needs’ of their own ‘real’ selves. So long as each player recognises and plays the part set him by reason – the faculty that understands his true nature and discerns his true ends – there can be no conflict. Each man will be a liberated, self-directed actor in the cosmic drama.

Spinoza tells us that children, although they are coerced, are not slaves, because they obey orders given in their own interests, and that the subject of a true commonwealth is no slave, because the common interests must include his own. Similarly Locke says ‘Where there is no
law there is no freedom’, because rational laws are directions to a man's proper interests or ‘general good’; and adds that since such laws are what ‘hedges us from bogs and precipices’ they ‘ill [deserve] the name of confinement’, and speaks of desires to escape from such laws as being irrational, forms of ‘licence’, ‘brutish’ etc. Montesquieu, forgetting his liberal moments, speaks of political liberty as being not permission to do what we want – or even what the law allows – but only ‘the power of doing what we [194] ought to will’, which Kant virtually repeats. Burke proclaims the individual’s ‘right’ to be restrained in his own interest, because ‘the presumed consent of ever rational creature is in unison with the predisposed order of things’.

The common assumption of these thinkers (and of many a schoolman before them and Jacobin and Communist after them) is that the rational ends of our ‘true’ natures must coincide, or be made to coincide, however violently our poor, unreflective, desire-ridden, passionate, empirical selves may cry out against this process. Freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid, or bad. To force empirical selves into the right pattern is no tyranny, but liberation.17

Thus Rousseau tells me that if I freely surrender all parts of my life to society, I create an entity which, because it has been built by an equality of sacrifice of all its members, cannot wish to hurt any one of them; in such a society, we are informed, it can be in nobody’s interest to damage anyone else. ‘In giving myself to all, I give myself to none’, and get back as much as I lose, with enough new force to preserve my new gains. Kant tells me that when ‘the individual has entirely abandoned his wild, lawless freedom, to find it again, unimpaired, in a state of dependence according to law’, that alone is true freedom, ‘for this dependence is the work of my own will acting as a lawgiver’. Liberty, so far from being incompatible with authority, becomes

17 On this Bentham seems to me to have said the last word: ‘The liberty of doing evil, is it not liberty? If it is not liberty, what is it then? Do we not say liberty should be taken away from fools, and wicked persons, because they abuse it?’ Compare with this a typical statement of Jacobin doctrine of the same period: ‘no man is free in doing evil. To prevent him is to free him.’
virtually identical with it. This is the thought and language of both the
great Declarations of the Rights of Man and Citizen, [195] and of all
those who look upon society as a design constructed according to the
rational laws of the wise lawgiver or nature or history or the Supreme
Being. Bentham almost alone doggedly went on repeating that the
business of laws was not to liberate but to restrain: ‘Every law is an
infraction of liberty.’

If the underlying assumptions had been correct – if the method of
solving social problems resembled the way in which solutions to the
problems of the natural sciences are found, and if reason were what
rationalists said that it was – all this would perhaps follow. In the ideal
case, liberty coincides with law, autonomy with authority. A law which
forbids me to do what I could not, as a sane being, conceivably wish
to do, is not a restraint of my freedom; in the ideal society, composed
of wholly reasonable beings, such laws would, because I should
scarcely be conscious of them, gradually wither away. Only one social
movement was bold enough to render this assumption quite explicit
and accept its consequences – that of the Anarchists. But all forms of
liberalism founded on a rationalist metaphysics are less or more
watered-down versions of this creed.

In due course, the thinkers who bent their energies to the solution
of the problem on these lines came to be faced with the question of
how in practice men were to be made rational in this way. Clearly they
must be educated. For only the uneducated are irrational,
heteronomous, and need to be coerced, if only to make life tolerable
for the rational, if they are to live in the same society, and not be
compelled to withdraw to a desert or some Olympian height. But the
uneducated cannot be expected to understand or co-operate with the
purposes of their educators. Education, says Fichte, must inevitably
work in such a way that ‘You will later recognise the reasons for what
I am doing now.’ Children cannot be expected to understand why they
are compelled to go to school, nor the ignorant – that is, for the

18 [This sentence appears at the beginning of chapter 10 of Bentham’s
*Theory of Legislation*, trans. from the French of Étienne Dumont by R.
Hildreth (London, 1871), 48. Dumont constructed this work from
Bentham’s manuscripts.]
moment, the majority of mankind – why they are made to obey the laws that will presently make them rational. ‘Compulsion is also a kind of education.’ You learn the great virtue of obedience to superior persons. If you [196] cannot understand your own interests as a rational being, I cannot be expected to consult you or abide by your wishes, in the course of making you rational. I must, after all, force you to be protected against smallpox even though you may not wish it. Even Mill is prepared to say that I may forcibly prevent a man from crossing a bridge if there is not time to warn him that it is about to collapse, for whatever his behaviour may indicate, I know that he cannot wish to fall into the water. Fichte knows what the uneducated German of his time wishes to be or do better than he can possibly know them for himself. The sage knows you better than you know yourself, for you are the victim of your passions, a slave living a heteronomous life, purblind, unable to understand your true goals. You want to be a human being. It is the aim of the State to satisfy your wish. ‘Compulsion is justified by education for future insight.’

The reason within me, if it is to triumph, must eliminate and suppress my ‘lower’ instincts, my passions and desires, which render me a slave; similarly (the fatal transition from individual to social concepts is almost imperceptible) the higher elements in society – the better educated, the more rational, those who ‘possess the highest insight of their time and people’ – may exercise compulsion to rationalise the irrational section of society. For, as Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet have often assured us, by obeying the rational man we obey ourselves – not indeed as we are, sunk in our ignorance and passions, sick creatures afflicted by diseases that need a healer, wards who need a guardian, but as we could be if we were rational, as we could be even now if only we would listen to the rational element which is, ex hypothesi, within every human being who deserves the name.

The Hegelian philosophers, from the tough, rigidly centralised, ‘organic’ State of Fichte, to the mild liberalism of T. H. Green, certainly supposed themselves to be fulfilling, and not resisting, the rational demands which, however inchoate, were to be found in the breast of every sentient being. And if I break away from the
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teleological determinism of the Hegelians towards some more voluntarist philosophy, I may conceive the idea of imposing on my society – for its own betterment – a plan of my own, which in my rational wisdom I have elaborated; and which, unless I act on my own, perhaps against the permanent wishes of the vast majority [197] of my fellow citizens, may never come to fruition at all. Or, abandoning the concept of reason altogether, I may conceive myself as an inspired artist, who moulds men into patterns in the light of his unique vision, as painters combine colours or composers sounds; humanity is the raw material upon which I impose my creative will; even though men suffer and die in the process, they are lifted by it to a height to which they could never have risen without my coercive – but creative – violation of their lives.

This is the argument used by every dictator, inquisitor and bully who seeks some moral, or even aesthetic, justification for his conduct. I must do for men (or with them) what they cannot do for themselves, and I cannot ask their permission or consent because they are in no condition to know what is best for them, and what they will permit and accept may mean a life of contemptible mediocrity, or perhaps even their ruin and suicide. Let me quote from the true progenitor of the heroic doctrine, Fichte, once again: ‘No one has … rights against reason.’ ‘Man is afraid of subordinating his subjectivity to the laws of reason. He prefers tradition or arbitrariness.’ Nevertheless, subordinated he must be. Fichte puts forward the claims of what he called reason, but Napoleon or Carlyle or romantic authoritarians may worship other values, and see in them the only path to ‘true’ freedom.

The same attitude was more pointedly expressed by Auguste Comte who asked why, if we do not allow freethinking in chemistry or biology, we should allow it in morals or politics. Why indeed? If it makes sense to speak of political truths – in the sense of social ends which all men, once they are discovered, must agree to be such; and if, as Comte believed, scientific methods will in due course reveal them, then what case is there for freedom of opinion or action – at least as an end in itself, and not merely as a stimulating intellectual climate, either for individuals or for groups? Why should any conduct be tolerated that is not authorised by appropriate experts? Comte put bluntly what had been implicit in the rationalist theory of politics from
its ancient Greek beginnings. There can, in principle, be only one correct way of life. The wise lead it spontaneously, that is why they are called [198] wise. The unwise must be dragged towards it by all the social means in the power of the wise: for why should demonstrable error be suffered to survive and bred? The immature and untutored must be made to say to themselves: ‘Only the truth liberates, and the only way in which I can learn the truth is by doing blindly today what you, who know it, order me, or coerce me, to do, in the certain knowledge that only thus will I arrive at your clear vision, and be free like you.’

We have wandered indeed from our liberal beginnings. This argument, employed by Fichte in his latest phase and by Hegel, and after them by other defenders of authority, from Marx and the positivists to the latest nationalist or Communist dictator, is precisely what the Stoic and Kantian morality protests against most bitterly in the name of the reason of the free individual following his own inner light. In this way the rationalist argument, with its assumption of the single true solution, has led from an ethical doctrine of individual responsibility and individual self-perfection to an authoritarian State obedient to the directives of an elite of Platonic guardians.

What can have led to so strange a reversal – the transformation of Kant’s sharp individualism into something close to a pure totalitarian doctrine on the part of thinkers who claimed to be his disciples? This question is not of merely historical interest, for not a few contemporary liberals have gone through the same peculiar evolution. It is true that Kant insisted, following Rousseau, that a capacity for rational self-direction belonged to all men, that there could be no experts in moral matters, since morality was a matter not of specialised knowledge (as the Utilitarians and philosophes had maintained), but of the correct use of a universal human faculty; and consequently that what made men free was not acting in certain self-improving ways, which they could be coerced to do, but knowing why they ought to do so, which nobody could do for, or on behalf of, anyone else. But even Kant, when he came to deal with political issues, conceded that no law, provided that it was such that I should, if I were asked, approve it
as a rational being, could possibly deprive me of any portion of my rational freedom.

With this the door was opened wide to the rule of experts. I cannot consult all men about all enactments all the time. The government cannot be a continuous plebiscite. Moreover, some men are not as well attuned to the voice [199] of their own reason as others: some seem singularly deaf. If I am a legislator or a ruler, I must assume that if the law I impose is rational (and I can only consult my own reason) it will automatically be approved by all the members of my society so far as they are rational beings. For if they disapprove, they must, pro tanto, be irrational. Then they will need to be repressed by reason: whether their own or mine cannot matter, for the pronouncements of reason must be the same in all minds.

I issue my orders and, if you resist, take it upon myself to repress the irrational element in you which opposes reason. My task would be easier if you repressed it in yourself: I try to educate you to do so. But I am responsible for public welfare, I cannot wait until all men are wholly rational. Kant may protest that the essence of the subject's freedom is that he, and he alone, has given himself the order to obey. But this is a counsel of perfection. If you fail to discipline yourself, I must do so for you; and you cannot complain of lack of freedom, for the fact that Kant's rational judge has sent you to prison is evidence that you have not listened to your own inner reason, that, like a child, a savage, an idiot, you are not ripe for self-direction or permanently incapable of it.19

19 Kant came nearest to asserting the 'negative' ideal of liberty (in one of his political treatises) when he declared that 'The greatest problem of the human race, to the solution of which it is compelled by nature, is the establishment of a civil society universally administering right according to law. It is only in a society which possesses the greatest liberty [...] – and also the most exact determination and guarantee of the limits of [the] liberty [of each individual] in order that it may co-exist with the liberty of others – that the highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all her capacities, can be attained in the case of mankind.' Omitting the teleological implications, this formulation does not at first appear very different from orthodox liberalism. The crucial point, however, is how to determine the criterion for the 'exact determination and guarantee of the limits' of
[200] If this leads to despotism, albeit by the best or the wisest – Sarastro’s temple in *The Magic Flute* – but still despotism, which is then identified with freedom, can it be that there is something amiss in the premises of the argument? That the basic assumptions are themselves somewhere at fault? Let me state them once more: first, that all men have one purpose, and one only, that of rational self-direction; second, that the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single universal, harmonious pattern, which some men may be able to discern more clearly than others; third, that all conflict, and consequently all tragedy is due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational, or the insufficiently rational – the immature and undeveloped elements in life – whether individual or communal, and that such clashes are, in principle, avoidable, and for rational beings

individual liberty. Mill, and liberals in general, at their most consistent, want a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realise as many of their ends as possible, without assessment of the value of these ends as such save in so far as they may frustrate the purposes of others; they wish the frontiers between individuals or groups of men to be drawn solely with a view to preventing collisions, so far as possible, between human purposes, all of which must be considered to be ultimate, uncriticisable ends in themselves. Kant, and the rationalists of his type, do not regard all ends as of equal value. For them the limits of liberty are determined by applying the rules of ‘reason’, which is more than the mere generality of rules as such, and is the same in, and for, all men. In the name of reason anything [200] that is non-rational may be condemned, so that the various personal aims which their individual imaginations and idiosyncrasies lead men to pursue, for example aesthetic and other non-rational kinds of self-fulfilment, may, at least in theory, be ruthlessly suppressed to make way for the demands of reason. The authority of reason and of the duties it lays upon men is identified with individual freedom, on the assumption that only rational ends can be the ‘true’ objects of a ‘free’ man’s ‘real’ nature.

I have never, I must own, understood what ‘reason’ means in this context; and merely wish to point out that the a priori assumptions of this philosophical psychology are not compatible with empiricism: that is to say any doctrine founded on knowledge [derived from] experience of what men are and seek.
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impossible; finally, that when all men have been made rational, they will obey the rational laws of their own natures, which are one and the same in them all, and so be at once wholly law-abiding and wholly free. Can it be that Hume is right and Socrates mistaken, that virtue is not knowledge, and freedom not identical with either; that despite the fact that it rules the lives of more men than ever before in its long history, not one of the basic assumptions of this famous view is demonstrable, or, perhaps, even true?

VI

[The search for status]

There is yet another historically important approach to this topic, which, by confounding liberty with her sisters, equality and [201] fraternity, leads to similarly illiberal conclusions. Ever since the issue was raised towards the end of the eighteenth century, the question of what is meant by ‘an individual’ has been asked persistently, and with increasing effect. In so far as I live in society, everything that I do inevitably affects, and is affected by, what others do. Even Mill’s strenuous effort to mark the distinction between the spheres of private and social life breaks down under examination. Virtually all Mill’s critics have pointed out that everything that I do may have results which will harm other human beings. Moreover, I am a social being in a deeper sense than that of mere interaction with others. For am I not what I am to some degree, in virtue of what others think and feel me to be?

When I ask myself what I am, and answer: an Englishman, a Chinese, a merchant, a man of no importance, a millionaire, a convict – I find upon analysis that to possess these attributes entails being recognised as belonging to a particular group or class by other persons in my society, and that this recognition is part of the meaning of the most of the terms that denote some of my most personal and permanent characteristics. I am not disembodied reason. Nor am I Robinson Crusoe, alone upon his island. It is not only that my material life depends upon interaction with other men, or that I am what I am as a result of social forces, but that some, perhaps all, of my ideas about myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social
identity, are intelligible only in terms of the social network in which I am (the metaphor must not be pressed too far) an element.

The lack of freedom about which a man or nation complains amounts, as often as not, to the lack of proper recognition. I may be seeking not for what Mill would wish me to seek, namely security from coercion, from arbitrary arrest, tyranny, deprivation of certain opportunities of action, or for spaces within which I am legally accountable to no one for my movements. Equally, I may not be seeking for a rational plan of social life, or the self-perfection of a dispassionate sage. What I may seek to escape is simply being ignored, or patronised or despised, or being taken too much for granted – in short, not being treated as an individual, having my uniqueness insufficiently recognised, being classed as a member of some featureless amalgam, a statistical unit without identifiable, specifically human features and purposes of my own. This is the degradation that I am fighting against – not for equality of legal rights, nor for liberty to do as I wish (although I may want these too), but for a condition in which I can feel that I am, because I am treated as being such, a responsible agent, whose will is taken into consideration as being entitled to it, even if I am attacked and persecuted for being what I am, or choosing as I do.

This is a hankering after status and recognition: ‘The poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he.’ I desire to be understood and recognised, even if this means to be unpopular and disliked. And the only persons who can so recognise me, and thereby give me the sense of being someone, are the members of the society to which, historically, morally, economically, and perhaps ethnically, I feel that I belong. The individual self is not something which I can

20 [202] This has an obvious affinity with Kant’s doctrine of human freedom; but it is a socialised and empirical version of it, and therefore almost its opposite. Kant’s free man needs no public recognition for his inner freedom. If he is treated as a means to some external purpose, that is wrong on the part of his exploiters, but his own ‘noumenal’ status is untouched, and he is fully free, and fully a man, in absolute isolation. The
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detach from my relationship with others, or from those attributes of myself which consist in their attitude towards me. Consequently, when I demand to be liberated from, let us say, the status of political or social dependency, what I demand is an alteration of the attitude towards me of those whose opinions and behaviour help to determine my own image of myself.

What oppressed classes or nationalities as a rule demand is neither simply unhampered liberty of action for their members, nor, in the first place, equality of social or economic opportunity, still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, organic State devised by the rational lawgiver. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition (of the class or nation, or colour or race) as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it (whether it is good, or legitimate, or not) and not to be ruled, educated, guided, with however light a hand, as being not quite fully human, and therefore not quite fully free.

This gives a far wider than a purely rationalist sense to Kant’s remark that paternalism is ‘the greatest despotism imaginable’; paternalism is despotic, not because it is more oppressive than naked, brutal, unenlightened tyranny, nor merely because it ignores transcendental reason embodied in me, but because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a human being, determined to make my own life in accordance with my own (not necessarily rational or benevolent) purposes, and, above all, entitled to be recognised as such by others. For if I am not so recognised, then I may fail to recognise, or may doubt, my own claim to be a fully independent human being. For in large part what I am is determined by what I feel and think; and what I feel and think is determined by the feeling and thought

need spoken of here is bound up wholly with the relation that I have with others; I am nothing if I am unrecognised; I cannot ignore the attitude of others with Byronic disdain, fully conscious of my own intrinsic worth and vocation, or escape into my inner life, for I am in my own eyes as others see me. I identify myself with the point of view of my milieu. I feel myself to be somebody or nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole; mine is the most heteronomous condition imaginable.
prevailing in the society to which I belong, of which, in Burke’s sense, I form not an isolable atom, but an ingredient (to use a perilous but indispensable metaphor) in a social pattern. I may feel unfree in the sense of not being recognised as a self-governing individual human being; but I may feel it also as a member of an unrecognised or insufficiently respected group. Then I wish for the emancipation of my entire class, or nation, or race, or profession. So much can I desire this that I may, in my bitter longing for status, prefer to be bullied and misgoverned by some member of my own oppressed class or race, by whom I am, nevertheless, recognised as a man and a rival – that is, as an equal – to being well and tolerantly treated by someone from some higher and remoter group, who does not recognise me for what I wish to feel myself to be.

This is the heart of the great cry for recognition on the part of both individuals and groups, and, in our own day, of professions and classes, nations and races. Although I may not get ‘negative’ liberty at the hands of the members of my own society, yet they are members of my own group; they understand me as I understand them; and this understanding creates within me the sense of being somebody in the world. It is this desire for reciprocal recognition that leads the most authoritarian of democracies to be, at times, consciously preferred by its members to the most enlightened of oligarchies, or sometimes causes a member of some newly liberated Asian or African State to complain less today when he is rudely treated by members of his own race or nation than when he was governed by some cautious, just, gentle, well-meaning administrator from outside. Unless this phenomenon is grasped, the ideals and behaviour of entire peoples who, in Mill’s sense of the word, suffer deprivation of elementary human rights, and who, with every appearance of sincerity, speak of enjoying more freedom than when they possessed a wider measure of these rights, becomes an unintelligible paradox.

Yet it is not with liberty, in either the ‘negative’ or in the ‘positive’ sense of the word, that this desire for status and recognition can easily be identified. It is something no less profoundly needed, and passionately fought for, by human beings – something akin to, but not
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itself freedom: it is more closely related to solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding, need for association on equal terms, all of which is sometimes – but misleadingly – called social freedom. Social and political terms are necessarily vague. The attempt to make the vocabulary of politics too precise may render it useless. But it is no service to the truth to loosen usage beyond necessity. The essence of the notion of liberty both in the 'positive' and the 'negative' senses is the holding off of something or someone – of others, who trespass on my field or assert their authority over me, or of obsessions, fears, neuroses, irrational forces – intruders and despots of one kind or another. The desire for recognition is a desire for something very different: for union, closer understanding, integration of interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice. It is only the confusion of desire for liberty with this profound and universal craving for status and understanding, further confounded by being identified with the notion of social self-direction, where the self is no longer the individual but the ‘social whole’, that makes it possible for men, while submitting to the authority of oligarchs or dictators, to claim that this in some sense liberates them.

Much has been written on the fallacy of regarding social groups as being literally persons or selves whose control and discipline of their members is no more than self-discipline, voluntary self-control which leaves the individual agent free. But even on the ‘organic’ view, would it be natural or desirable to call the demand for recognition and status a demand for liberty in some third sense? It is true that the group from which recognition is sought [205] must itself have a sufficient measure of ‘negative’ freedom – from control by any outside authority – otherwise recognition by it will not give the claimant the status he seeks. But the struggle for higher status, the wish to escape from an inferior position, is this to be called a struggle for liberty? Is it mere pedantry to confine this word to the main senses discussed above, or are we, as I suspect, in danger of calling any adjustment of his social situation favoured by a human being an increase of his liberty, and will this not make this term so vague and distended as to cease to be worth employing? And yet we cannot simply dismiss this case as a mere confusion of the notion of freedom with those of status, or solidarity, or fraternity, or equality, or some combination of these. For the
craving for status is in certain respects very close to the desire to be an independent agent.

We may refuse this goal the title of liberty; yet it would be a shallow view that assumed that analogies between individuals and groups, or organic metaphors, or several senses of the word ‘liberty’, are mere fallacies, due either to assertion of likeness between entities in respects in which they are unlike, or simple semantical confusion. What is wanted by those who are prepared to barter their own and others’ liberty of individual action for the sake of the status of their group, and their own status within the group, is not simply a surrender of liberty for security, for some assured place in a harmonious hierarchy in which all men and all classes know their place, and are prepared to surrender the painful privilege of choosing – ‘the burden of freedom’ – for the peace and comfort and relative mindlessness of an authoritarian or totalitarian structure. No doubt there are such men and such desires, and no doubt such surrenders of individual liberty can occur, and, indeed, have often occurred. But it is a profound misunderstanding of the temper of our times to assume that this is what makes nationalism or Marxism attractive to nations which have been ruled by foreign masters, or to classes whose lives were directed by other classes in a semi-feudal, or some other hierarchically organised, regime. What they seek is more akin to what Mill called ‘pagan self-assertion’, but in a collective, socialised form. Indeed, much of what he says about his own reason for desiring liberty – the value that he puts on boldness and non-conformity, on the assertion of the individual’s own values in the face of the prevailing opinion, on strong and self-reliant personalities, free from the leading-strings of the official [206] lawgivers and instructors of society – has little enough to do with his conception of freedom as non-interference, but a great deal to do with the desire of men not to have their personalities set at too low a value, assumed to be incapable of autonomous, original, ‘authentic’ behaviour, even if such behaviour is to be met with opprobrium or social restrictions or inhibitive legislation.
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This wish to assert the ‘personality’ of my class, or group or nation, is not wholly unrelated to the answer to the question ‘What is to be the area of authority?’ (for the group must not be interfered with by outside masters), and even more with ‘Who is to govern us?’ – govern well or badly, liberally or oppressively, but above all ‘Who?’ And such answers as ‘By representatives elected by my own and others’ untrammelled choice’, or ‘All of us gathered together in regular assemblies’, or ‘The best’, or ‘The wisest’, or ‘The nations as embodied in these or those person or institutions’, or ‘The divine leader’ are answers logically, and often also politically and socially, independent of what extent of ‘negative’ liberty I demand for my own or my group’s activities. Provided the answer to ‘Who shall govern me?’ is somebody or something which I can represent as ‘my own’, as something which belongs to me, or to whom I belong, I can, by using words which convey fraternity and solidarity as well as some part of the connotation of the ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘freedom’, which it is difficult to specify more precisely, describe it as a hybrid form of freedom, or at any rate as an ideal which is perhaps more characteristic than any other in the world today, yet one which no existing term seems to fit. Those who purchase it at the price of their ‘negative’ Millian freedom, certainly claim to be ‘liberated’ by this means, in this confused, but ardently felt, sense. ‘Whose service is perfect freedom’ can in this way be secularised, and the State or the nation or the race, or an assembly, or a dictator, or my family or milieu, or I myself can be substituted for the Deity, without thereby rendering the word ‘freedom’ wholly meaningless.21

21 This argument should be distinguished from the traditional approach of some of the disciples of Burke or Hegel who say that since I am made what I am by society or history, that to escape from them is impossible, and to attempt it irrational. No doubt I cannot leap out of my skin, or breathe outside my proper element; it is a mere tautology to say that I am what I am, and cannot want to be liberated from my essential characteristics, some of which are social. But it does not follow that all my attributes are intrinsic and inalienable, and that I cannot seek to alter my status within the ‘social network’ or ‘cosmic web’ which determine my nature; if this were the case no meaning could be attached to such words as ‘choice’ or ‘decision’ or ‘activity’. If they are to mean anything, attempts to protect myself against
No doubt every interpretation of the word ‘liberty’, however unusual, must include a minimum of what I have called ‘negative’ liberty. There must be an area within which my wishes are not frustrated. No society literally suppresses all the liberties of its members; a being who is prevented by others from doing anything at all that he wishes to do is not a moral agent at all, and could not either legally or morally be regarded as a human being, even if a physiologist or a biologist, or even a psychologist, felt inclined to classify him as a man. But the fathers of liberalism – Mill and Constant – want more than this minimum: they demand the maximum degree of non-interference compatible with the minimum demands of social life.

It seems unlikely that this demand for liberty has ever been made by any but a small minority of highly civilised and self-conscious human beings. The bulk of humanity has certainly at most times been prepared to sacrifice this to other goals: security, prosperity, power, virtue, rewards in the next world; or justice, equality, fraternity, and many other values which appear wholly or on part incompatible with the attainment of the greatest degree of individual liberty, and certainly do not need it as a precondition for their own realisation. It is not a demand for Lebensraum for each individual that has stimulated the rebellions and wars of liberation in which men were ready to die in the past, or, indeed, in the present. Men who have fought for freedom have commonly fought for the right to be governed by themselves or their representatives – sternly governed, if need be, like the Spartans, with little individual liberty, but in a manner which allowed them to participate, or at any rate to think that they were participating, in the legislation and administration of their collective lives. And men who have made revolutions have, as often as not, meant by liberty no more than the conquest of power and authority by a given sect of believers in a doctrine, or of a class, or of some other social group, old or new.

authority, or even to escape from ‘my station and its duties’ cannot be excluded as automatically irrational or suicidal. ['My Station and Its Duties' is the title of an essay by F. H. Bradley in his Ethical Studies (London, 1876), 145–92.]
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Their victory certainly frustrated those whom they ousted, and sometimes repressed, enslaved or exterminated vast numbers of human beings. Yet such revolutionaries have usually felt it necessary to argue that, despite this, they represented the party of liberty, or ‘true’ liberty, by claiming universality for their ideal, which the ‘real selves’ of even those who resisted them were also alleged to be seeking, although they were held to have lost the way to the goal, or had mistaken the goal itself owing to some moral or spiritual blindness. All this has little to do with Mill’s notion of liberty as limited only by the danger of doing harm to others. It is the non-recognition of this psychological and political fact (which lurks behind the apparent ambiguity of the term ‘liberty’) that has, perhaps, blinded some contemporary liberals to the world in which they live. Their plea is clear, their case is just. But they do not allow for the variety of human wishes. Nor yet for the ingenuity with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the fulfilment of one wish is also the fulfilment of its contrary.

VII

[Liberty and sovereignty]

The French Revolution, like all great revolutions, was, at least in its Jacobin form, just such an eruption of the desire for the ‘positive’ freedom of collective self-direction on the part of a large body of Frenchmen, who felt liberated as a nation, even though the result was, for a good many of them, severe restriction of individual freedoms. Rousseau had spoken exultantly of the fact that the laws of liberty might prove to be more austere than the yoke of tyranny. Tyranny is service to human masters. The laws cannot be a tyrant. Rousseau does not mean by liberty the ‘negative’ freedom of the individual not to be interfered with within a defined area, but the possession by all – and not merely by some of – the fully qualified members of a society of a share in public power, which is entitled to interfere with every aspect of every citizen’s life. The liberals of the first half of the nineteenth century correctly foresaw that liberty in this ‘positive’ sense could easily destroy every ‘negative’ liberty that they held sacred.
They pointed out that the sovereignty of the people could easily destroy that of individuals. Mill explained, patiently and unanswerably, that government by the people was not, in his sense, necessarily freedom at all. For those who govern are not necessarily the same ‘people’ as those who are governed, and democratic self-government is not the government ‘of each by himself’ but, at best, of ‘each by all the rest’. Mill and his disciples spoke of the tyranny of the majority and of the tyranny of ‘the prevailing opinion and feeling’, and saw no great difference between that and any other kind of tyranny which encroaches upon men’s activities beyond the sacred frontiers of private life.

But no one saw the conflict between the two types of liberty better, or expressed it more clearly, than Benjamin Constant. He pointed out that the transference by a successful rising of unlimited authority, commonly called sovereignty, from one set of hands to another does not increase liberty, but merely shifts the burden of slavery. He reasonably asked why a man should deeply care whether he is crushed by a popular government or by a monarch, or even by a set of oppressive laws. He saw that the main problem for those who desire ‘negative’, individual freedom is not who wields this authority, but how much authority should be placed in any set of hands. For unlimited authority in anybody’s grasp is bound, he believed, sooner or later, to destroy somebody. He maintained that usually men protest against this or that set of governors as oppressive, when the real cause of oppression lies in the mere fact of the accumulation of power itself, wherever it may happen to be, since liberty is endangered by the mere existence of absolute authority as such. ‘It is not against the arm that one must rail,’ he wrote, ‘but against the weapon. Some weights are too heavy for the human hand.’ Democracy may disarm a given oligarchy, a given privileged individual or set of individuals, but it can still crush individuals as mercilessly as any previous ruler. Equality of the right to oppress is not equivalent to liberty. Nor does universal consent to loss of liberty somehow miraculously preserve it merely by being universal, or by being consent. If I consent to be oppressed, or acquiesce in my condition with detachment or irony, am I the less
oppressed? If I sell myself into slavery, am I the less a slave? If I commit suicide, am I the less dead because I have taken my own life freely?

‘Popular government is merely a spasmodic tyranny, monarchy a more centralised despotism.’ Constant saw in Rousseau the most dangerous enemy of individual liberty. Rousseau had declared that ‘In giving myself to [210] all, I give myself to none.’ Constant could not see why, even though the sovereign is ‘everybody’, it should not oppress one of the ‘members’ of its indivisible self, if it so decided. I may, of course, prefer to be deprived of my liberties by an assembly in which I am a perpetual minority. It may give me an opportunity one day of persuading others to do for me that to which I feel I am entitled. But to be deprived of my liberty at the hands of everyone save myself is to be deprived of it just as effectively. Hobbes was at any rate more honest: he did not pretend that a sovereign does not enslave; he justified this slavery, but at least did not have the effrontery to call it freedom.

Throughout the nineteenth century liberal thinkers correctly maintained that if liberty involved a limit upon the powers of any man to force me to do what I did not wish to do, then whatever the ideal in the name of which I was coerced, I was not free; that the doctrine of absolute sovereignty was a tyrannical doctrine in itself. If I wish to preserve my liberty, it is not enough to say that it must not be violated unless someone or other – the absolute ruler, or the popular assembly, or the king in Parliament, or the judges, or some combination of authorities, or the laws themselves – for the laws may be oppressive – authorises its violation. I must establish a society in which there must be some frontiers of freedom which nobody should ever be permitted to cross. Different names or natures may be given to the rules that determine these frontiers: they may be called natural rights or the word of God, or natural law, or the demands of utility or of the ‘deepest interests of man’; I may believe them to be valid a priori, or assert them to be my own subjective ends, or the ends of my society or culture. What these rules or commandments will have in common is that they are accepted so widely, and grounded so deeply in the actual nature of men as they have developed through history, as to be, by now, an essential part of what we mean by being a normal human
being. Genuine belief in the inviolability of a minimum extent of individual liberty entails some such absolute stand. For it is clear that it has little to hope for from the rule of majorities, which is logically uncommitted to it, and historically has failed to protect it, while remaining faithful to its own principles. Few governments have found much difficulty in causing their subjects to generate any will that the government wanted. The triumph of despotism is to force the slaves to declare themselves free.  

22 It may need no force: the slaves may proclaim their freedom quite sincerely; but they are still slaves. Perhaps the chief value for liberals of political – ‘positive’ – rights, namely that of participating in the government, is as a means for protecting what they hold to be an ultimate value – individual, ‘negative’, liberty.

But if democracies can, without ceasing to be democratic, suppress freedom, at least as liberals have used the word, what would make a society free? For Mill, Constant, Tocqueville and the liberal tradition to which they belong, no society is free unless it is governed by at any rate two interrelated principles: first, that no power, but only rights, can be regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever power governs them, have an absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanely; and, second, that there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and widely accepted that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is to be a normal human being, and, therefore, also of what it is to act barbarously or inhumanely; rules of which it would be absurd to say, for example, that they could be abrogated by some formal procedure on the part of some court or

22 [This sentence was placed in quotation marks by Berlin, but I have not been able to find a published source for it. It might possibly be a garbled version of Goethe’s ‘Niemand ist mehr Sklave als der sich für frey hält ohne es zu sein’ (‘No one is more enslaved than he who believes that he is free without being so’). Die Wahlverwandtschaften (Tübingen, 1809) ii 202 (part 2, chapter 5, ‘From Ottilie’s Diary’). I am indebted to Jaap Engelsman for this hypothesis.]
sovereign body. When I speak of a man as being normal, a part of what I mean is that he could not break these rules without a qualm of revulsion. It is such rules as these that are broken when a man is declared guilty without trial, or punished under a retroactive law; or when children are ordered to denounce their parents; or friends to betray one another; or soldiers to use methods of barbarism; when men are tortured or murdered, or minorities are massacred because they irritate a majority or a tyrant. Such acts, even if they are made legal by the sovereign, cause horror even in these days, and this springs from the recognition of the moral validity, irrespective of the laws, of some absolute barriers to the imposition one man’s will on another. The freedom of a society, or a class or a group, in this sense of freedom, is measured by the strength of these barriers, and the number and importance of the paths which they keep open for their members – if not for all, for at any rate a great number of them.23

This is almost at the opposite pole from the purposes of those who believe in liberty in the ‘positive’ – self-directive – sense. The former want to curb authority as such. The latter want it placed in their own hands. That is the cardinal issue. These are not two different interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the end of life. It is as well to recognise this, even if it is in practice often necessary to strike a compromise between them. For each of them makes absolute claims. These claims cannot both be fully satisfied, but it is a profound lack of social and moral understanding not to recognise that the satisfaction that each of them seeks is an ultimate value which, both historically and morally, has an equal right to be classes among the deepest interests of mankind.

VIII

[The One and the Many]

23 In Great Britain such legal power is, of course, constitutionally vested in the absolute sovereign – the king in Parliament. What makes this country free, therefore, is the fact that this theoretically omnipotent entity is restrained by custom or opinion from behaving as such. It is clear that what matters is not the form of these restraints on power – whether they are legal, or moral, or constitutional, but their effectiveness. See also 000/0.
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals – justice, or progress, or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class; or even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society. This is the belief that somewhere, in the past, or in the future, in divine revelation, or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith – for such it is – rests on the conviction that all the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another. ‘Nature binds truth, happiness and virtue together by an indissoluble chain,’ said one of the best men who ever lived, and spoke in similar terms of liberty, equality and justice.24

[213] But is this true? It is a commonplace that neither political equality nor efficient organisation are compatible with more than a modicum of individual liberty, and certainly not with unrestricted laissez-faire; that justice and generosity, public and private loyalties, the demands of genius and the claims of society, can conflict violently with each other. And it is no great way from that to the generalisation that not all good things are compatible, still less all the ideals of mankind. But somewhere, we shall be told, in some way, it must be

24 Condorcet, from whose Esquisse these words are quoted, declares that the task of social science is to show ‘by what bonds nature has united the progress of enlightenment with that of liberty, virtue and respect for the natural rights of man; how these ideals, which alone are truly good, [213] yet so often separated from each other that they are even believed to be incompatible, should, on the contrary, become inseparable, as soon as enlightenment has reached a certain level simultaneously among a large number of nations’. He goes on to say that ‘Men still preserve the errors of their childhood, of their country and of their age long after having recognised all the truths needed for destroying them.’ Ironically enough, the belief of this learned, noble and intelligent man, in the need and possibility of uniting all good things, may be precisely the kind of error he so well described.
possible for all these values to live together, for unless this is so, the universe is not a cosmos, not a harmony; unless this is so, the conflict of values may be an intrinsic, irremovable element in human life. To admit that the fulfilment of some of our ideals may in principle make the fulfilment of others impossible is to say that the notion of total human fulfilment is a formal contradiction, a metaphysical chimera. For every rationalist metaphysician, from Plato to the last disciples of Hegel or Marx, this abandonment of the notion of a final harmony in which all riddles are solved, all contradictions reconciled, is abdication before brute facts, an intolerable bankruptcy of reason before things as they are, a failure to explain and to justify, to reduce to a system, which ‘reason’ indignantly rejects.

But those who are not armed with an a priori guarantee for the proposition that a total harmony of true values is somewhere to be found – perhaps in some ideal realm the characteristics of which we can, in our finite state, not so much as conceive – we must fall back on the ordinary resources of empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge. And these certainly give us no warrant for supposing (or even understanding what would be meant by saying) that all good things, or all bad things for that matter, are reconcilable with each other. The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, the realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because this is their situation, that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if they had an assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by me on earth, no ends pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central importance of the freedom to choose. Any method of bringing this final state nearer would then seem fully justified, no matter how much freedom were sacrificed to forward its advance.

It is, I have no doubt, some such dogmatic and a priori monism that has been responsible for the deep, serene, unshakeable conviction in the minds of some of the most merciless tyrants and persecutors in
I do not say that the ideal of self-perfection, whether for individuals or nations, or Churches, or classes, is to be condemned in itself, or that the language which was used in its defence was in all cases the result of a confused or fraudulent use of words, or of moral or intellectual perversity. Indeed I have tried to show that it is the notion of freedom in its ‘positive’ sense that is at the heart of the demands for national or social self-direction which animate the most powerful public movements of our time, and that not to recognise this is to misunderstand the most vital facts and ideas of our age. But equally it seems to me that the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realised is demonstrable false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict – and of tragedy – can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition. This gives its value to freedom as Acton had conceived of it – as an end in itself, and not as a temporary need arising out of our confused notions and disordered lives, a predicament which a panacea could one day put right.

25 Bentham once again seems to me to have stated the truth in this matter: ‘Individual interests are the only real interests. […] Can it be conceived that there are men so absurd as to […] prefer the man who is not, to him who is; to torment the living, under pretence of promoting the happiness of those who are not born, and who may never be born?’ This is one of the infrequent occasions when Burke agrees with Bentham; for this passage is at the heart of the empirical, as against the metaphysical, view of politics.
the strong, whether their strength is physical or economic, must be restrained. This maxim claims respect, not as a consequence of some a priori rule, whereby the respect for the liberty of one man logically entails respect for the liberty of others like him; but simply because respect for the principles of justice or equality is as basic in men as the desire for liberty. Burke’s plea for the constant need to compensate, to reconcile, to balance, Mill’s plea for novel ‘experiments in living’, with their permanent possibility of error, in the knowledge that it is not merely in practice, but in principle, impossible to reach clear-cut and certain answers, or a priori guarantees of the rationality or ‘truth’ of our arrangements, may madden those who seek for final solutions and single, all-embracing systems, guaranteed to be eternal. Nevertheless, it is a conclusion that cannot be escaped by those who, [216] with Kant, have learnt the truth that ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.’

The ‘negative’ liberty that they strive to realise seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek, in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. Truer, because it recognises the fact that, when we choose one course of action or form of life, we may be forced to sacrifice to it another which is no less ultimate, and perhaps incommensurable with the former. To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, is to turn moral decision into an operation which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform. To say that in some ultimate, all-reconciling but realisable synthesis duty is interest, or individual freedom is pure democracy, is to throw a metaphysical blanket over self-deceit or deliberate hypocrisy. More humane because it does not (as system-builders do) deprive men of much that they have found to be indispensable [217] to their life as human beings. But in the end men choose between ultimate values; they choose as they do because their life and thought are determined by fundamental moral categories and concepts that are as much a part of their being and conscious thought and sense of their own identity as their basic physical structure.

It may be that the ideal of freedom to live as one wishes – and the pluralism of values connected with it – is the fruit of our declining
capitalist civilisation: an ideal which remote ages and primitive societies have not known, and one on which posterity will look with curiosity but little comprehension. This may be so; but no sceptical conclusions seem to me to follow. Principles are not less sacred because their duration cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire to guarantee that our values are harmonious, eternal and secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the certainties of childhood or the absolute values of primitive societies. ‘To realise the relative validity of one’s convictions’, said an admirable writer of our time, ‘and yet stand for them unflinchingly is what distinguishes a civilised man from a barbarian.’ To demand unity and certainty is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to guide one’s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and far more dangerous, moral and political immaturity.

I. Berlin

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