How close should the relationship be between those who work in the world of academic research and those whose jobs are practical policy-making, politics or diplomacy? This question confronts academics in the Humanities, and in the Social and Natural Sciences, not least those who work in the area of international relations and European politics. Much of the funding academics receive comes from the taxpayer, and the outcomes of political and policy decisions affect academics also, as taxpayers and citizens. However, many academics have also taken an active role, participating in decision making, and observing the process of governance, or international politics. They may see this as an opportunity to garner insights that might not otherwise be available to them. They also hope that they may be able to influence outcomes, or at least that their writings may be better informed and in time seep into the political culture of the day: the informal influence of scholars upon government is an honourable part of the Western tradition. Yet academics must also have freedom of expression, and be able to air unpopular or unexpected ideas without fear, in short, to be able to talk truth to power and not to act as, or be thought to be mere ciphers for establishment views. The complex relationship between the state, private organisations and academic communities during the cold war now attracts the attention of cold war scholars, intelligence, and cultural historians on both sides of the Atlantic.
Sir Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997), was a fascinating example of a so-called ‘cold war intellectual’: he was an esteemed scholar, a political philosopher, and historian of ideas, and a very well-known public intellectual. He was, and still is generally considered to be one of the best-known political philosophers and intellectual historians of the 20th century, at least in the English speaking world. His work was coloured by his preoccupation with the idea of liberty; with Russian literature and thinking; and with the baleful influence of communism and the Soviet Union. Politically, he identified himself very strongly with an Anglo-American view of the cold war, and he was informed by his time in the British Embassy in Washington during the War, and then in the British Embassy in Moscow as the early cold war set in. He was a man who both reflected, and influenced the cultural positioning of the UK as Atlanticist, and anti-communist.³

Berlin’s early life story is very remarkable, not least as an example of how forced migration affects individual identity and the migrant’s sense of belonging. He was born in 1909, into a prosperous Jewish merchant family in Riga. At this time, Riga was the capital of Livonia, part of the Russian empire, but with a culture that was however as much German as Russian, Latvian, or Yiddish. In 1916, the Berlins left for Petrograd, where they stayed while the politics of the rest of the First World War, the Balfour Declaration, the Russian Revolution, the beginning of the Russo-Polish war were played out. By the end of 1920, the family finally fled to England. When the Berlin family arrived in London, Isaiah spoke virtually no English, (though he spoke German, as well as Russian, and some Latvian and Yiddish), but soon found his way through the English education system, flourished at St Paul’s School (a boys’ private day school) and went in 1928 to study classics, and then Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the University of Oxford. In 1932, he became a fellow of the prestigious All Souls College, the closest the United Kingdom then got to a purely research institute. It was during this period that he began to situate himself first as a philosopher, then as an intellectual historian. Berlin was to remain attached to the University of Oxford for over forty years, although he also had forays into active diplomacy for the British Foreign Office, and his later ideas were drawn in part from the politics of the world he saw around him during these periods.
When war broke out in 1939, Berlin was deeply hurt by the fact that he was not allowed to contribute to the war effort as he had been born in Latvia, and so he stayed in Oxford. His work on Marx convinced him that historical context was vital to an understanding of the growth and development of political ideas, but it also left him with a loathing of historical determinism which he said was used as ‘the chief ideological excuse for Stalin’s crimes.’ Then in mid 1940, Guy Burgess (of course as yet unknown in the UK as a Soviet spy, but now claiming to Berlin to be on an MI5 intelligence mission) suggested Berlin might go to Moscow with him as an embassy press officer, as cover for Burgess’s own activities. This decision was so quickly agreed by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Information that Berlin did not have time to apply for a visa until he had arrived in the US on his way to Moscow. However, this became an administrative disaster: Burgess was recalled to London just after the two had arrived in New York. Then, although Berlin did manage to get a visa, Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, refused to have him on his staff in Moscow. So he was left stranded, (having temporarily given up his Oxford post), until given an offer of work with the British Press Service in New York.

Within six months, Berlin proved himself to be a very competent analyst and report-writer, and so went on to spend the next four years in the US working for the Ministry of Information and then the Foreign Office, honing his report-writing skills with analyses on the state of American opinion from the British Embassy in Washington. The Washington visit was memorable for many reasons: the wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s soft-power strategy was to woo and then to influence the Americans as Allies, and the Embassy was crammed with additional British staff and advisors, many of them plucked from British universities. Berlin reported back to London on the state of American public opinion, while also keeping up an extensive correspondence about his work and observations. He was considered a hugely successful report writer, and made his name amongst the British establishment of the day.
He also made innumerable contacts with both Zionist lobbyists (especially Chaim Weizmann), with British and American elite journalists, with diplomats and others, meeting and working with senior US diplomats, including George Kennan and Charles Bohlen in the State Department, and generally enjoying the hothouse atmosphere of the British Embassy in Washington where there were nearly 3000 additional staff. One of his last dispatches was to reflect on the possible consequences of the death of Roosevelt in April 1945.

However, from the end of 1944, Berlin had been manoeuvring with his contacts in the Foreign Office to get a position back in London, as he was finding his post in Washington ‘a morally exhausting process.’ The distinguished historian, Arnold Toynbee offered him a post as the head of the Soviet Section of the Foreign Office Research Department, but Berlin declined, saying that he would need first to return to Moscow before he could consider such a post. He mused in January 1945, that, after a spell back in London, perhaps even in the Cabinet Office, he would be happy to return to Oxford, but would also like to ‘retain some sort of semi-academic connection with the FO.’ However, his boss, the British Ambassador Lord Halifax took a dim view of Berlin’s efforts to persuade his friends in London to get him moved back, and it was finally agreed Berlin would stay in Washington until May 1945, attending the San Francisco conference to help with Russian translation.

Berlin then hoped to be sent to the important three-power Potsdam conference. It seems that this idea was scotched at the very last moment by the then Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who apparently had heard rumours about Berlin’s personal dislike of him, much to the disgust of his friends who thought he had been badly treated. However, even before this minor fiasco, the Ambassador to Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr (later Lord Inverchapel), had invited Berlin to Moscow for three months, to prepare a dispatch on the state of American-British-Soviet relations in the world. This led to Berlin’s second mission for HMG, this time between 1945 and 1946, when he went to the British Embassy in Moscow for six months. The visit to Moscow was to be totally different from
the time he spent in the US. As the cold war descended across Europe and the wider world, British perceptions and policies were shifting on what line to take with the Soviet Union, which had nevertheless been a wartime ally since 1941. In September 1945 Berlin set off for Moscow, passing through Berlin, and meeting in that shell-shocked city with his friends from British intelligence, including Noel Annan. Excited but apprehensive, he was now returning to Moscow, and to a country he and his family had had to leave over twenty years earlier when he was only a schoolboy.

Moscow in 1945 was not an agreeable posting for British diplomats. All available accounts describe the isolation endured by Western diplomats, the harsh living conditions, and the atmosphere of tension in the early postwar months. Clark Kerr favoured an Anglo-Soviet alliance, then under discussion in London, and clearly thought Berlin could be useful as a conduit to Soviet opinion formers. Also in the British Embassy at this time was Frank Roberts, who was already an experienced East European specialist. The American Embassy in Moscow was then run by Averell Harriman, who then went to London as US Ambassador, and who had George Kennan as his minister-counsellor. The latter’s own career in Moscow in this period was distinguished by the famous Long Telegram, and Berlin already knew him from Washington. Harry Hopkins, also known to Berlin from Washington, was sent out briefly by Truman towards the end of 1945.

Berlin was meant to be writing a major piece on strategy for the Foreign Office. His social and linguistic skills, the positive reputation that he had acquired during his time in Washington as a networker and as an able and interesting commentator on US affairs for London, his affability and especially his determination to revisit the Soviet Union somehow or other, had all helped him to secure this project. Indeed, this was a crucial moment in British foreign policy, as the newly elected Labour government sought to make up-to-date threat assessments in the face of the total collapse of Germany, and the armed presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Military and intelligence circles in the UK were already very apprehensive about future Soviet conduct. Officials in the Foreign Office had not yet fully made up their mind, although there were strongly
rooted anti-communist sentiments amongst its specialist officials. It was obvious that Britain could not now act alone, and that the United States would have to be on board, whatever policy decisions were made. The European powers were in no shape to give immediate and substantial weight or aid to any strategic realignment at this time – Eastern Europe found itself increasingly under Soviet influence, while the countries of Western Europe were battling with the consequences of war and occupation. So Isaiah Berlin was, in theory, particularly well placed to make a significant input to policy and perceptions at a genuinely important moment of flux.

He was given the task of preparing weekly reports on the Soviet press, as he had done in Washington, although the nature of this task would of course be completely different in Moscow. But his love of parties, gossip and chatter - his forte in the US - was to be of less avail in Moscow, where suspicion and resentment dominated. So while he was clearly close to his American and British colleagues, making contacts with Soviet professionals was to be very hard. However, his interests focused upon the artistic and cultural figures in Moscow and Leningrad at the time, and he quickly secured invitations to visit Boris Pasternak, and the poet Anna Akhmatova, and to go to artistic and theatrical events, while all the time observing the impact of the war and its ending upon society and the Soviet regime. Those artists who had survived seemed overwhelmed in 1945 by the ‘shame that haunted all survivors of the era just passed’, while most had been completely cut off from intellectual developments in the west from the 1930s onwards. Berlin also went back for a week to Leningrad, where he had of course lived in as a child, when it was known as Petrograd. There he met Anna Akhmatova in a series of meetings which have acquired an almost cult-like status amongst literary writers, (although it appears that Berlin had not actually read her work).

Ignatief argues that it was these meetings with Akhmatova that convinced Berlin to write, not the strategic account for which he was being paid by the Foreign Office, but a resume of the cultural history of Russia in the Twentieth Century, and of Stalin’s fight against established Russian culture. It is possible to see this as a cultural equivalent of Kennan’s Long Telegram in terms of its assessment of the Soviet Union, although
Kennan’s report had enormous and immediate political consequences, in a way that Berlin’s certainly did not. His report that was completed by the end of December 1945. It was massive but provided what Frank Roberts called it a ‘realistic’ and ‘very thorough and entertaining study of a very important section of Soviet society, and incidentally casts much light upon general conditions in the Soviet Union.’ Berlin now left Moscow, going through Sweden and back to the Washington Embassy until he returned to Oxford in April 1946. He thought that the document was a ‘rambling discourse on the Russian writers which appears tome an even darker jungle…than it had looked in Moscow.’ He wrote to Averell Harriman that he thought his document on literature in the Soviet Union would not be read, and that he continued to think of the FO ‘with some nostalgia but no regret of the world to which I do not think I shall ever be recalled.’

Berlin’s career - and fame - grew, but it does seem to be the case that he never sought to work for the Foreign Office after the 1940s, and indeed his papers reveal him to have been hostile towards the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. Yet Berlin was to remain a source of informal, but informed ideas about the Soviet Union for the Foreign Office and he was approached informally about the possibility of working in the Office’s Eastern European department, but without success. Sir Oliver Franks invited him to attend the Marshall Plan conference in Paris in the summer of 1947. He stayed there for only a few weeks, disliking both the atmosphere there and the hard graft of technical international negotiation.

Instead, Berlin became a player in what we now think of as the cultural cold war, as both his intellectual judgements on communism, and his anti-Soviet ideas deriving from his own personal experiences in the 1940s fused to make him an important member of the British Atlanticist and anti-communist intellectual elite. The tide was turning against those who favoured continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, while the future role of the United Kingdom itself remained unclear. Although a victorious power, it was bankrupt, yet still saddled with global responsibilities over its restive empire. Foreign office officials, politicians and strategists all knew that cold war politics could only be effective only if Britain and the United States thought in a similar way about the
Soviet threat, as there was no realistic or achievable balance of global power without the United States as part of the equation. Its west European partners, France in particular, presented small comfort to the United Kingdom as allies, given their own problems and weaknesses.

Isaiah Berlin thus soon came to epitomise the new Americanism of British intellectual life. He acquired a powerful reputation as an anti-communist, a zionist, and articulate pro-American public academic. Oxford remained at the centre of his public life, although he increasingly looked beyond its confines to London, and to the United States itself. He found that he was now accepted among British intellectual elites in both Oxford and London, and increasingly in Russian Centres in the United States, and that he was becoming a willing commentator and indeed protagonist in the new cultural cold war that was taking shape by the late 1940s. At a time when both the ‘establishment’ and the intellectual elite in Britain were small, and totally dominated by Whitehall, the major parties, and the universities of Oxford, London, and Cambridge, personal contacts were of the greatest importance, and his voluminous correspondence bears witness to his ability to maintain very close personal contacts with those in government, as well as with fellow-academics. He was widely sought after as a specialist on the broader aspects of Soviet affairs. He gave talks to all political parties, and in Chatham House (the Royal Institute for International Affairs), was well known as a radio broadcaster, and wrote for Foreign Affairs. The lesson that he took from this visit to the Soviet Union was that individuals did have, indeed had to have, the capacity and ability to stand up to the forces of tyranny that now swirled through the Soviet political system. However, he thought the Russians also saw Britain like an ‘old chronic complaint… tiresome, annoying… probably incurable and madly irritating but not likely to lead to a really serious crisis unless complications set in.’ Yet the influence he now brought to the British government was informal and fragmented, shaped by his own elite networks, and driven by his own agenda.

Indeed, he now realised that he was also not an academic in any traditional mould: he found writing hard, got bored with teaching, and much preferred talking about
ideas, socialising, and public debate. His wartime and early postwar experiences had therefore led him to prefer to see the wider ‘pattern in the carpet’, supporting zionism while refusing to move to Israel and vigorously opposing Jewish terrorism; exploring the roots of intellectual developments in the Soviet Union while despising Stalin’s polices and repression of individual liberties; writing short and profound pieces, rather than making detailed and specific reports and studies for government; curiously cautious but intellectually outspoken.

The fundamental lesson Berlin had learnt in Washington, and then reinforced in the Soviet Union from 1945-6, was that Britain had to align itself as closely as possible with the United States. This was ironic, given that it is clear that he personally preferred European cultures, with their own variety and complexity. He was a displaced, multilingual European himself, but did not appear to take much interest in the federalist, functionalist or integrationist thinking that many elites on the European mainland were pursuing. For example, he was unable and unwilling to provide much practical help to the Foreign Office when he was approached about the possibility of incorporating a ‘spiritual’ dimension to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s proposal for a European union against totalitarianism in early 1948. He wrote a long piece for the Foreign Office, arguing that there was no ‘Western’ philosophical ideas that excluded Eastern marxism, ‘any more than in chemistry of mathematics’. Rather, there were conflicting views about social life, in particular civil liberties, and a lack of belief that class affected each individual’s ideas of the world. There is little evidence of his interest in the Council of Europe which was created in 1949, and which he might have been expected to have become a champion, given that the Council’s European Convention of Human Rights specifically privileged the individual over the state, and negative liberties over positive liberties, although he did see the Council’s potential as a ‘straw in the wind’ for the future. He wrote cautiously in 1949, only weeks after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, and just before the Council of Europe agreement was signed, as follows. ‘I feel that on the situation of western Europe in general my thoughts are really not worth setting down, publicly or privately. I am deeply, and I fear, incurably, ignorant on economics both theoretical and applied…. Whenever I try to make even the political
aspect of these things clear to myself, I find myself formulating at best plausible platitudes, as worst a confused scrap heap of odd thoughts and memories casually thrown together….on things like the UNO, the North Atlantic Pact etc, I have nothing worth communicating.'²⁸

Nevertheless, he lectured to great effect in both the UK – including lectures for the FO and the War Office - and in the US. He tried to get Boris Pasternak to the UK from 1946 onwards.²⁹ His talks, his writing about Winston Churchill, and his other essays reinforced the hard-edged, Anglo-American thrust of Western cold war politics, unpacking a relationship that was a ‘marriage from which…there is no hope, or fear, of ultimate divorce.’ Britain had become part of the natural sphere of United States policy far more than had France or Italy, although he thought that the Labour government still had a ‘desperate reluctance to realise that things are what they are and that their consequences will be what they will be.’³⁰ Indeed, he reflected in 1951 that ‘the principal preoccupation of many Western Europeans was how to avoid being crushed in the collision of the great giants against both of whom a rising resentment began to be felt. The Kulturkampf between the two worlds had reached the stage which made other issues, and attempts at synthesis between the rival systems of ideas… now see both irrelevant and futile.’³¹

Although there is no evidence that he did work that was knowingly funded by the CIA, or deliberately became involved in the covert cultural politics of the late 1940s and the 1950s, Berlin’s prestige, status and written output nevertheless made him a figure in the new British Americanism of the cultural cold war, and he found himself completely comfortable with the epithet of a cold war intellectual. As he said when the scandal broke about the CIA subsidies to the cultural magazine, Encounter, to which he had contributed, ‘I did not in the slightest object to American sources supplying the money – I was (and am) pro-American and anti-Soviet, and if the source had been declared I would not have minded in the least’.³²
The Soviet trip of 1945-6 had made a deep impact on him. He described Moscow as ‘fantastic, and tiresome though it sounds, the essence can scarcely be grasped unless one (a) stays there, (b) knows enough of the language to discover what the inhabitants say in streets and buses. …what the Soviet Union seemed to me most like was the severe type of English public school….Marxism is like a school of religion, early morning services for which the boys are allowed to turn out in the bitterest weather….The boys do not exactly believe in the principles of their school with passionate conviction, but they largely take them for granted and acquiesce. Life is really quite tolerable for the conformist majority and hell for the eccentric and sensitive’. 33

The visit to the Soviet Union of course forms only a small vignette in the complex and varied life of Isaiah Berlin. He was an intellectual who was of assistance to the Foreign Office only on his own terms: when he got bored with reporting on the US, of assisting in San Francisco, or Paris in 1947, he pulled back. He preferred the cultural to the political in the Soviet Union. His contacts with British decision-makers were nevertheless profound and important, but conducted again on his own terms, and in his own way. 34 Yet, at a psychological level, he continually strove to be ‘one of us’, and the sense of being an outsider continued to infuse his writings, letters, and conversations, even as he became acknowledged as one of the leading members of the British intellectual establishment.

His zionism, his passionate anti-Soviet and anti-communist stance, coupled with his ability to steer his own particular liberal path through and up into the heart of the British establishment give him a very significant place in British postwar intellectual society- and a very particular socio-psychological profile. Berlin was an iconic part of the British cultural cold war, a siren voice speaking to power from the safety of academia, while keeping his distance from the rough and tumble of day to day politics. 36 It is of course impossible to disentangle fully the way in which he reflected the cultural politics of the 40s and beyond, while also contributing to its development. Yet it is clear that he helped his academic colleagues, national and international decision-makers and the informed public, to understand, formulate and shape the big issues of the day, on which
government then had to make decisions. His career thus us much about the complex but powerful relationship between at least one university intellectual and the Whitehall decision-makers in the years during which Britain re-invented its cold war Atlanticism, while at the same time emerging as sceptical European great power.

1 HILL, Christopher and BESCHOFF, Pamela (eds), Two Worlds of International Relations: academics, practitioners and the trade in ideas. (London: 1994)


3 Isaiah Berlin had the great luck to secure Dr Henry HARDY as his editor. Hardy has also drawn together Berlin’s archive (now housed by the University of Oxford), and list of his publications, which is accessible at http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/. Michael IGNATIEFF wrote an authorised biography, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, London: 1998, upon which I have relied for the narrative of Berlin in the 1940s. Ignatieff’s book is largely based upon extensive interviews with Berlin over a decade, and the archival material referred to above. Berlin’s Jewishness, and his very active but subtle Zionism is not dealt with in this essay

4 Berlin had a minor physical deformity that would most probably also have precluded him from active service

5 IGNATIEFF, Isaiah Berlin, 93. BERLIN, Isaiah, Karl Marx, Oxford: 1939


7 In 1943, Berlin privileged his personal, zionist interests over the policy of his employer, the Foreign Office, and then also concealed his own role in leaking information about UK policy. This raises important ethical questions about his behaviour, but these were never known about / confronted by the Foreign Office at the time. Ignatieff also ducks the significance of what it was that Berlin did, by rather shamefully blaming the culture of the Foreign Office, IGNATIEFF, 117-8. Henry HARDY and Jennifer HOLMES say that Berlin’s role in Washington was ‘a key role representing the British government’ although the bulk of his output during this time was in fact assessing the political scene in the US for the British government,

Berlin found Toynbee’s proposal ‘rather insulting.’ There was also a suggestion that Berlin might be made the FO’s librarian, or a press attaché in Paris (offered by Duff Cooper), Mss BERLIN, B/B1.112, Berlin to Anthony Rumbold (FO), 11.01.1945

Mss BERLIN, B/B1/112, Jock Balfour to Berlin, 27.07.1945. Berlin was given a CBE, (Commander of the British Empire) award in the January 1946 New Years Honours list, no doubt in part a sort of apology, or ‘a sop to heal my pride greatly wounded during the month of July rather than a reward for largely imagined services’, Mss BERLIN, B/B1/113, Berlin to Frank Darvall, 13.02.1946; Berlin to Bevin, 13.0201946, Mss BERLIN, fol 73. BERLIN, Flourishing, 582-3. The Berlin papers are full of personal comments about his colleagues, and Berlin was particularly critical of Truman’s new advisors, Berlin to Sargent, 07.05.1945, Mss BERLIN, B/B1/112, fol 56.

Mss BERLIN, B/B1/112, Berlin to Christopher Hill, 29.05.1945, fol 112ff; Berlin to WGS Adams (Warden of All Souls College) 06.06.1945 (119ff)


It was then published as, X, [sic, George Kennan] ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct,’ Foreign Affairs, 1947, 25/4


IGNATIEFF, Berlin, 143. In 1956, Pasternak gave Berlin the manuscript of Zhivago, for publication in the West, IGNATIEFF, Berlin, 147.

The accounts given to Ignatieff do not have an entirely convincing ring, combining as they do, unexpected meetings in Leningrad bookshops while being ‘minded’ by a British Council representative; being pursued by a boorish Randolph Churchill; undertaking the political meetings required of him, as well as falling under the spell of Akhmatova. She was to suffer terribly from the Soviet authorities as a result of Berlin’s visits. Six years later, Berlin’s uncle, who still lived in the Soviet Union was also rounded up, imprisoned for over a year, and accused being in a spy ring with Berlin ; IGNATIEFF, Berlin, 148-169. Wolfson College’s professorial poet Jon Stallworthy penned a poem about Berlin and this episode: http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/tribute/guest1.htm

United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA) FO 371/56725, Isaiah Berlin, ‘A Note on Literature and the Arts in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in the closing months of 1945’; Roberts to Bevin, No 29; Roberts to Warner, 23 January 1946

Mss BERLIN, Berlin to Harriman, 26.03.1946, fol54, Berlin to Roberts, B.B1.113, fol89

Mss BERLIN, B/B1/115, Fol 28
My own personal interest in this topic stems in part from the fact that Berlin raised the money for and then founded Wolfson College, a graduate college which is an integral part of the collegiate structure of the University of Oxford, of which I have been a Governing Body member since 1998. The College has a governing body of nearly seventy University professors whose expertise covers the social sciences, natural sciences and the arts. It has an outstanding liberal, humanist character, and an egalitarian and non-hierarchical atmosphere and culture. It shuns the religious affiliations, biases, or inclinations of many other Oxford colleges.

22 Mss BERLIN, Berlin to Angus Malcolm, 20.02.1946, fol 96. Berlin used the term Russian, not Soviet, no doubt deliberately
23 Oliver Franks, one of those who did make the journey between academia and diplomacy - and back – with enormous success both in the implementation of Marshall Aid, and then as Ambassador to the US, took the same individualistic approach to written scholarship, commenting that he thought the opinion of his academic colleagues, elaborated over personal discussion, was far more important to his own intellectual self-respect, than any more widely read and disseminated peer-reviewed publication.
DANCHEV, Alex, Oliver Franks: Founding Father, Oxford: 1993
24 IGNATIEFF, Berlin, 130
25 Mss BERLIN, B.B1.116, Fol 253, 274
26 UKNA, FO953/144, Berlin to FO, handwritten letter, 17 March 1948; BERLIN, Enlightening, 44ff
27 Mss BERLIN 429, fols 75ff, , though Berlin still remained wary of German power
28 Mss BERLIN, 118, 15 April 1949, Fol 282
29 Mss BERLIN, Brimelow to Berlin, 13.05.1046, fol 208 ; Roberts to Berlin, 17.05.1946, fol211
30 The Listener, 29 September, 1949
31 Mss BERLIN, 429, Fol s 1-13, The Year 1950, 1951
32 Quoted by IGNATIEFF, Berlin, 199, from a letter from Berlin to J Rees, 1994
33 Mss BERLIN, Berlin to Angus Malcolm, 20.02.1946, fol 96
34 He used his diplomatic contacts to acquire much literature from the Soviet Union, and diplomats kept in touch with him, especially in relation to cultural developments in the Soviet Union
35 For example, a Berlin draft on the Jewish Agency, Mss BERLIN, B/B1/114, fol 27ff. He was also involved in drafting material for Weizmann, Mss BERLIN, B/B1/115, 01.01.1947, fol 29ff